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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the impact of international reserves, terms of trade shocks and capital flows on
the real exchange rate (REER).  We observe that international reserves cushions the impact of TOT
shocks on the REER, and that this effect is important for developing but not for industrial countries.
This buffer effect is especially significant for Asian countries, and for countries exporting natural
resources. Financial depth reduces the buffer role of IR in developing countries. Developing countries
REER seem to be more sensitive to changes in reserve assets; whereas industrial countries display
a significant relationship between hot money and REER.
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This note evaluates how international reserves hoarding and economic structure affect the real 
exchange rate (REER) and its adjustment to inflows of capital, terms of trade shocks, and other 
shocks.  We compare the REER patterns between developing and the OECD countries.
1  The 
background of our study is the presumption that volatility induces first order adverse effects on the 
economic performance of developing countries.
2  Recently, Aghion et al. (2006) found that REER 
volatility reduces growth for countries with relatively low levels of financial development; hence 
factors mitigating REER volatility may be associated with superior economic performance.  Other 
studies have unraveled the fact that TOT improvement leads to REER appreciation through the 
income effect.
3 For most developing countries, terms of trade shocks are the most important source of 
exogenous volatility.  Developing countries are exposed to TOT volatility that is 3 times the volatility 
of industrial countries, resulting in income shocks that are 3.5 times as volatile as those affecting 
industrial countries [see IDB (1995) and Hausmann et al. (2006)].  Dealing with TOT volatility is a 
challenge for natural resources exporters, exposed to TOT volatility that is 3 times the volatility of 
manufacturing countries.
4  TOT shocks impose a daunting challenge for developing countries.  
Shallow domestic financial systems, relatively small size, and the lack of sectoral diversification in 
most developing countries limit their ability to mitigate TOT shocks by internal adjustment. 
Sovereign risk and the lack of proper financial instruments inhibit the ability to hedge against these 
shocks by relying on the global financial system (see Caballero (2003)).  Developing countries are 
left with self-insurance as a last resort option of dealing with TOT shocks. 
Our study examines the degree to which international reserves mitigate the impact of terms of 
trade (TOT) shocks on the REER. We find that this effect is important for developing countries, 
especially important for Asian countries, and for countries exporting natural resources, but not for 
industrial ones.  We also confirm that financial depth is a key element in determining the degree of 
mitigation offered by international liquidity.  The overall results are robust to adding controls like 
capital flows, exchange rate management and monetary policy, trade and financial openness. 
 
 
                                                 
1   See Edwards (1989) and Edwards and Savastano (2000), Cheung, Chinn, Fujii (1999), Chinn (2006) 
and Hau (2002) for studies dealing with for analysis of the REER in developing countries, and the impact of 
productivity and other macro forces on the REER. 
2   See IDB (1995). 
3   See Mendoza (1995) and Gregorio and Wolf (1994). 
4   See Appendix B for details.   2
1.  Effective TOT shocks and REER adjustment – the shock absorbing role of international reserves 
 
We start the analysis by testing the extent to which international reserves mitigate the impact 
of terms of trade shock on the REER. The empirical analysis covers 1970 to 2004, 60 developing 
economies and 20 industrialized economies.
5  
 
As a benchmark, we adopt a panel regression methodology: 
 
(1)  it it it i it RES TOT TO TOT TO a REER ε α α + + + = ) * )} ln( * ({ )) ln( * ( ) ln( 2 1 , 1 ; 
 
where the independent variable is the natural log of the real effective exchange rate (REER), defined 
such that higher REER indicates real appreciation (see Appendix A for definitions),  ) ln( * TOT TO  is 
the effective terms of trade, defined by the trade openness,
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International reserves/GDP rate. Buffering effects of international reserves would be captured by 
2 0 α < .  The mitigation of TOT shocks may stem from reducing the magnitude of the REER 
adjustment triggered by capital flows; thus, minimizing the odds that capital flight may end up with a 
full blown financial crisis, potentially triggered by balance sheet effects associated with nominal and 
REERs depreciations [see Calvo et .al (2004) and Mendoza (2005) for further discussion of these 
balance sheet effects].   Equation (1) is also consistent with the predicted patterns of financial 
intermediation and the real exchange rate in a collateral dependent open economy, extending the 
framework in Aizenman and Lee (2006) to a two sector model [see Appendix A].     
  A concern regarding regression (1) is the possibility of a unit root in the real effective 
exchange rate. The results of individual tests on REER series portraying these series as I(1) processes 
could be due to low power in those tests. We work around this problem using the panel unit root test 
developed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002).
6  Although we rejected the unit root hypothesis for the 
                                                 
5   See Appendix B for the exact list of countries include in each category. 
6   The test assumes that each individual unit in the panel shares the same AR(1) coefficient, but allows 
for individual effects, time effects and possibly a time trend. By introducing a series of lags, the test may be 
viewed as a pooled Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), with the null hypothesis of nonstationarity (I(1)) 
behavior.  See Taylor & Sarno (1998) and Calderon (2002) for other references to the stationarity of pooled 
REER series. 
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REER, we found high persistence: an autoregressive coefficient of about 0.84, but well below 1 (see 
Table B7, Appendix B).  
  The specification of regression (1) follows the observation that the effective terms of trade 
shock,  TO TOT d * ) ln( , is a first order approximation of the income effect associated with the terms 
of trade improvement rate,  ) ln(TOT d , where the income effect is defined as the GDP rate of change 
induced by the shock.
7  By design, (1) implies that the elasticity of the REER with respect to effective 
terms of trade shocks is  
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Hence, regression (1) provides information about the degree to which hoarding international reserves 
may impact REER dynamics induced by terms of trade shocks.  Table 1 reports the regression results 
for 1970-2004.  Column (1) presents the baseline regression pooling all countries, subject to data 
availability.   The elasticity of the REER with respect to the effective terms of trade shock is well 




Table 1: REER vs. Effective Terms of Trade and Mitigation through Reserve Accumulation 
Dependent 
Variable: ln(REER)  All  Developing  Industrial  Manufactures 
Natural 
Resources LATAM  ASIA 
Effective TOT  1.802*** 1.836***  0.95  0.442  4.376***  1.642**  2.269** 
  [0.244] [0.255]  [0.594]  [2.077]  [0.779]  [0.802]  [1.104] 
Effective TOT * Stock 
of Reserves  -3.873*** -3.937***  -1.603  12.269  -10.676  -0.537 -4.672** 
  [0.746] [0.766]  [4.607]  [23.668]  [7.013]  [9.164]  [2.280] 
Observations  1863 1260  603  271  253 343  202 
R-Squared  0.4549 0.4367  0.5947  0.4066  0.6162  0.3903  0.2161 
Years  1970-2004 1970-2004  1970-2004  1970-2004 1970-2004  1980-2004 1970-2004 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
This regression includes fixed country effects not reported in the table. 
 
                                                 
7   I.e., for small terms of trade shocks, ) ln( * / TOT TO GDP GDP Δ ≅ Δ .  
8   See Appendix G, Table G1, for regressions of the REER on the effective TOT and International 
reserves in the absence of interaction terms.   For developing countries, the elasticity of the REER with respect 
to the effective TOT is well above one, whereas the elasticity of the REER with respect to the stock of IR/GDP 
is well below minus one – higher stock of IR/GDP is associated, on average, with depreciated REER.   4
Column (1), Table 1 implies that ] * 2 1 [ 8 . 1 )] ln( * /[ ) ln( RES TOT d TO REER d − ≅ ; that is, 
international reserves hoarding lessens the elasticity of the REER with respect to the effective TOT 
by more than twice the International reserves/GDP.  Hence, for a country with trade openness of 
0.25, and IR/GDP ratio of 0.1, the elasticity of the REER with respect to the TOT is .25*1.8(1-2*0.1) 
= 0.36. This is in line with De Gregorio and Wolf (1994), who found that the elasticity of the REER 
with respect to TOT, unconditional of the RES position, is about 0.4 for a sample of OECD countries. 
Table 2 summarizes the elasticity of the REER with respect to both the effective and the regular 
TOT.  Developing countries, especially emerging Asia, and commodity exporters have been 
significantly more exposed to changes in the terms of trade. Increasing the stock of reserves in each 
of these countries could reduce this vulnerability to external shocks, smoothing the reactions of their 
REERs to terms of trade changes. 
 
Table 2: Means of the interaction terms and REER elasticity respect to ETOT and TOT 
 
 All  Developing  Industrial  Asia  LATAM 
Natural 
Resources Manufactures 
Means          
Reserves over GDP  0.09  0.108  0.055  0.163  0.078  0.075  0.056 
Trade Openness  0.23  0.24  0.2  0.32  0.16  0.19  0.22 
REER Elasticity to          
Effective  TOT  1.45 1.42 1.24 1.51 1.60 3.58  1.13 
Terms of Trade  0.33  0.34  0.25  0.48  0.26  0.68  0.25 
All means are calculated over the same sample period as in the equations displayed in table 1.  These elasticities are 
calculated based on the average holding of international reserves and average trade openness for each sub group.   
 
  Columns (2) and (3) in Table 1 show that aggregation matters – the mitigation effects 
associated with international reserves applies to developing, but not to Industrial countries.  This is 
consistent with the notion that limited development of the capital market in Developing countries 
hampers their ability to mitigate the volatility associated with shocks.  Economic structure matters 
greatly – exports of natural resources magnify the impact of the effective terms of trade shocks and 
the mitigation associated with international reserves by a factor exceeding  2.  Interestingly, this 
mitigation effect is insignificant for that group, yet we will show later that it is significant for the 
lagged effective TOT shock.  In contrast, these interactions are insignificant for manufacturing 
intense countries.  The last two columns focus specifically on Latin America and Asia; effective TOT 
shocks induce large effects in both blocks.  International reserves provide a powerful mitigation of 
effective TOT shocks in Asian countries, but not in LATAM.     5
Table B.8 in the Appendix supports the robustness of prior results, evaluating the adjustment 
to the one year lagged effective terms of trade shock on the contemporaneous REER: 
 
(1’)  1, 1 1 2 1 ln( ) ( *ln( )) ( *ln( )* ) it i it it it REER a TO TOT TO TOT RES α αε −− =+ + +  
 
The signs are identical to Table 1, the main difference being that shocks are apparently absorbed 
faster in LATAM and Asia, where most of the coefficients on the lagged shocks are insignificant for 
these blocks.  Tables C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C report country specific results.  The above suggests 
that the volatility of the real effective exchange rate would be mitigated by higher levels of 
international reserves.  We validate this conjecture in our data [see Appendix F].  For further 
reference to previous studies looking at this relationship see Hviding, Nowak, and Ricci (2004). 
  To verify robustness, Table C.1 in Appendix C reports distinct specifications of regressions 
(1) and (1’) for subsets of countries.  The regularities uncovered in these regressions include: 
•  Reserves play a role in the mitigation of TOT shocks only in Developing countries. This 
mitigation role is not displayed in Industrial countries under any specification. 
•  REERs in countries that specialize in exports of manufactures are inelastic to changes in their 
terms of trade. No role for reserves as shock absorber for this subgroup. 
•  Commodity exporters display a very elastic REER against changes in the terms of trade. This role 
is consistently more significant for lagged values of TOT. 
•  REERs in Latin American emerging economies are remarkably independent from changes in the 
TOT, and reserves do not seem to function as shock absorbers for those economies. Exceptions 
are Argentina, Chile or Ecuador (see table C.2 in the appendix). 
•  For Asian emerging markets, TOT changes clearly have an impact on their REER, and reserves 
play a central role moderating the effects of changes in the TOT. 
Appendix C submits our initial findings to a series of controls. We show that the transmission of 
effective terms of trade shocks into the REER and the buffer role of foreign liquid assets is 
augmented by greater flexibility of exchange rate regimes. REER seems to be more sensitive and 
reserves play a more prominent role after negative effective TOT shocks.  Although we do not find a 
significant change in the slope of the interaction between effective TOT and Reserves for all   6
developing countries after the 1997 Asian Crisis, we find that in Latin American economies and 
Commodity exporting countries, reserves play a bigger mitigation role after 1997. 
Faced by changes in their terms of trade, we expect that countries with deep financial markets 
will be able to internally self-adjust in a more effective manner than those with shallow markets.  To 
verify, we introduce the interaction of our reserve mitigation term [TO*ln(TOT)*RES] with a 
measure of financial depth represented by the M2 money aggregate deflated by GDP (see Appendix 
D).
9  Financial depth significantly decreases the role of reserves as shock absorber for our global 
sample of developing economies. This effect seems to be insignificant for Latin America, 
industrialized economies, commodities and manufacture exporters.  Interestingly, Asian economies 
seem to be extremely sensitive to both the mitigation effect of reserves and the role of financial 
development in the domestic market. The same regression holds for lagged values of terms of trade, 
reserves and liquid liabilities. Although the role of financial development seems to die faster than that 
of reserves for all emerging markets, the results are quite robust, especially for Asian economies, 
where both effects (that is, reserves as shock absorber and the corresponding mitigation of this role 
through financial depth) remain highly significant. 
To verify robustness, we estimate the REER adjustment in four ways [see Appendix E]: Panel 
with Country Effects, Country Effects on De-trended Real Effective Exchange Rate, Time and 
Country Effects on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate, and Country Effects and Quadratic Time 
trend on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate, controlling for various types of capital flows, 
exchange rate regime, trade and financial openness, and relative income.  Overall, the relationship 
between TOT, REER and the mitigation effect from reserve accumulation described above is robust 
to the inclusion of these controls.  Breaking Capital Inflows in several categories allows us to expose 
systematic distinctions in the effect of those flows on the REER for different subgroups of countries 
[see Table 3].   
•  Inflows associated with short term capital tend to appreciate the REER. Developing countries’ 
REER seem to be very sensitive to changes in reserve assets, fairly inelastic to movements of 
short term capital and highly inelastic to changes in long term foreign capitals. Industrial 
                                                 
9 Following King and Levine (1993) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2005) we experiment also with M3, Credit 
Allocated to the Private Sector and M3 minus M1.   7
countries display a very consistent positive correlation between FDI inflows and REER 
appreciations across the board. Inflows of Hot Money are also associated with real appreciations 
in these industrialized economies. When we interact reserves with trade openness, we observe 
that the effects of a decrease in reserves on the REER are diminished as we move towards greater 
trade openness [see Appendix E]. 
•  Manufactures exporters display a highly significant relationship between inflows of hot money 
and appreciation of the REER; while natural resource countries’ REER are not related to changes 
in capital inflows, once we adjust for trade openness. REER in Asian emerging economies 
consistently react to inflows of hot money, especially in those specifications that take trade 
openness into consideration. Changes in reserve assets and FDI inflows seem to play a minimal 
role in the determination of the REER for these Asian Economies. Latin American emerging 
markets REER seem to be considerably sensitive to changes in reserve assets although this 
relationship is broken when we use the interactions with trade openness. 
















Sign of the  
Significant Coefficient  +/- +/-  +/-  +/-  +/-  +/- 
Developing Countries  0/0 2/0  8/0  0/0  2/0  8/0 
Industrial Countries  6/0 8/0  5/0  8/0  8/0  2/0 
Manufactures Exporters  6/2 8/0  0/0  0/3  8/0  2/0 
Commodity Exporters  0/0 8/0  2/0  0/0  0/1  0/0 
Latin America  2/0 2/0  8/0  0/7  5/4 
(*)  0/0 
Asia  0/0 2/5  0/0  2/0  8/0  2/0 
 
Notes: Each number represents the number of significant (at 10 %) coefficients of each type of capital inflows to REER 
across our eight different specifications [See Appendix D].  “0/0” would correspond to 8 insignificant coefficients for that 
country subgroup. 
Positive signed coefficient uncovers a positive relationship between inflow and appreciation. For the case of Reserves, 
positive signed coefficients reveal a positive relation between reductions of official reserves and appreciations. 
(*) For Latin America there is a distinction between the effects of “Other Investment” inflows and “Portfolio” inflows.  
The former seem to be associated with appreciations of the REER while the later are associated to real depreciations. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
•  REER depreciation associated with FDI, found by Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2003), is only 
consistently present in manufactures exporters and Latin American economies once we account   8
for trade openness. FDI inflows tend to appreciate REER in industrial countries, even though at a 
lower rate than other types of capital. 
•  The results support the hypothesis that international trade helps mitigate pressures for real 
appreciation (see Hau (2002)). 
•  Nominal exchange rate depreciation has the expected negative effect on REER across the board. 
Natural resource exporters and Latin American economies seem to be especially sensitive to these 
changes in nominal exchange rates. 
•  Higher International reserves/GDP ratio is associated with depreciated REER.  However, this 
effect is mitigated by trade openness.  These results are much weaker for the OECD. 
2.  Concluding remarks 
Our paper suggests that hoarding and managing international reserves has the effect of mitigating 
the impact of TOT shocks on the REER. Consequently, countries exposed to TOT volatility may 
benefit from active management of international reserves in ways that go well beyond the 
conventional prerogative of a central bank (see Davis et. al. (2001) for a review of the experience of 
Chile and Norway).  Greater integration of financial markets may have increased the responsiveness 
of financial flows to TOT shocks [see Aizenman and Lee (2005), Rodrik (2006) and the references 
therein]. Hence, TOT improvement associated with higher domestic returns would induce capital 
inflows, leading to further REER appreciation.  Similarly, TOT deterioration may lead to disorderly 
outflows, where the rush to exit is motivated by the wish to minimize capital losses.  Better 
understanding of these issues is left for future investigation. 
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Appendix A: Financial intermediation, the real exchange rate and liquidity shocks 
 
This appendix outlines a model explaining equation (1).  It would be presumptuous for us to 
claim that we have a fully specified model that accounts for all the reasons for hoarding reserves, and 
that we control all the relevant variables.  Indeed, we doubt that such a model exists -- countries 
hoard reserves due to several motives beyond the traditional buffer stock and exchange rate 
management approaches.  The observed hoarding reflects changing circumstances, where 
precautionary and self insurance, mercantilist and REER stabilization motives seem to play greater 
role, possibly due to deeper financial and trade integrations [see Cheung  and Ito (2006) for an 
econometric evaluation of the changing patterns of hoarding international reserve
10].   In this 
appendix we outline a model explaining the REER stabilization role of international reserves in the 
presence of TOT shocks.  Our empirical strategy is to start testing the most rudimentary prediction of 
this model, stated in equation (1).  We verify the robustness of our findings by adding controls 
dealing with other variables identified as pertinent for accounting international reserves [exchange 
rate flexibility, trade and financial openness, etc.]. 
 
A growing literature has identified financial intermediation, in the presence of collateral 
constraints, as a mechanism explaining the hazard associated with credit cycles induces by shocks.  
The prominent role of bank financing in developing countries suggests that capital flights, induced by 
adverse terms of trade shocks or contagion, impose adverse liquidity shocks.  This appendix outlines 
a model describing conditions under which ex-ante hoarding of international reserves may provide a 
self insurance mechanism that would mitigate the real effects of liquidity shocks, ultimately reducing 
the adverse effects of terms of trade volatility on the GDP.  For simplicity, we focus on an ex-ante/ex 
post model dealing with the determination of the GDP level and the real exchange rate during one 
investment cycle.  Applying the logic of endogenous growth, one may extend the model to deal with 
the impact of terms of trade shocks on growth.    
As our focus is on developing countries, we assume that all financial intermediation is done 
by banks, relying on debt contracts. Specifically, we consider the case where investment in a long-
term project should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks. Hence, shocks may 
force costly liquidation of earlier investments, thereby reducing output. We solve the optimal demand 
                                                 
10 Cheung Y. W. and H. Ito (2006) "Cross-sectional analysis on the determinants of international reserves 
accumulation" manuscript, APEA annual conference Seattle, July 29-30.   Appendix                         2          
for deposits and international reserves by a bank that finances investment in long-term projects. The 
bank’s financing is done using callable deposits, exposing the bank to liquidity risk. Macro liquidity 
shocks, stemming from sudden stops and capital flights, cannot be diversified away.  In these 
circumstances, hoarding reserves saves liquidation costs, potentially leading to large welfare gains; 
gains that hold even if all agents are risk neutral. In this framework, deposits and reserves tend to be 
complements – higher volatility of liquidity shocks will increase both the demand for reserves and 
deposits.  This is another example of hoarding international reserves as a self-insurance against non-
diversifiable liquidity shocks.
11 
  We model the financial intermediation and the real exchange rate by combining Diamond and 
Dybvig’s (1983) insight with Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee’s (2003) modeling of market 
imperfections in a collateral dependent small open economy.
12  We construct a minimal model to 
explain the self insurance offered by international reserves, in mitigating the output effects of 
liquidity shocks with endogenous real exchange rate determination.  Investment in a long term project 
should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks.  Hence, the liquidity shock may 
force costly liquidation of the earlier investment, reducing second period output.  We simplify further 
by assuming that there is no separation between the bank and the entrepreneur – the entrepreneur is 
the bank owner, using it to finance the investment. 
We consider a small open economy, where a traded good Y is produced with capital and a 
country specific non-traded factor.  In addition, the traded sector includes exports of commodities, 
generating revenue which is determined by the realization of terms of trade shocks [= the relative 
price of the exported commodities to other traded goods].  The traded good Y is the numeraire. The 
relative price of the non-traded factor is denoted by p, and is referred to as the real exchange rate   
There is a continuum of lenders and borrowers and their number is normalized to 1.   
We focus now of the evolution of the economy throughout one investment cycle, where 
gestation lags imply that capital should be installed well before hiring specific non-traded input.  To 
simplify, the supply of the specific factor is inelastic, at a level Z.  The lenders in the economy cannot 
invest directly, but lend their saving at the international interest rate.  Depositors are entitled to a real 
                                                 
11 See Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992), Garcia and Soto (2004), Aizenman and Lee (2005), Jeanne and 
Ranciere (2005), and Rodrik (2006) for studies dealing with various aspects of self insurance and international 
reserves. See Flood and Marion (2002) for empirical assessment of hoarding international reserves.  
 
12 The model extends the one sector framework outlined in Aizenman and Lee (2005).     Appendix                         3          
return of f r on the loan that remains deposited for the duration of investment.  The safe return reflects 
a risk free investment opportunity, either in the form of a foreign bond, or as storage technology.  The 
borrowers are entrepreneurs who have investment opportunity, but are credit constrained.  The actual 
investment should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks.  The production function 







β β − = , 
where  1 K  is the non-liquidated capital invested at period 1, z is the level of country-specific input, 
hired at a relative price of  1 p .  Premature liquidation of capital is costly, and is associated with a 
proportionate adjustment cost of θ .  Specifically, reducing the capital stock by one dollar yields a net 
liquidity of  ) 1 /( 1 θ + .  The time line associated with financial intermediation is summarized in Figure 
A1.  At the beginning of period 1, the entrepreneur with initial wealth 1 H  , borrows 1 H μ .
13  The 
combined liquidity of  1 ) 1 ( H μ +  finances planned investment 1 K , and setting aside liquid reserves 1 R : 
 (A2)  11 1 (1 )HKR μ += + . 
  Next, a liquidity shock δ  realizes. A positive shock is inconsequential, because banks can 
accommodate positive liquidity shocks by purchasing a risk free bond, or investing in the risk free 
low yield storage technology. Hence, we focus our attention on adverse liquidity shocks, reducing 
desirable deposits form 1 H μ  to  ) 1 ( 1 δ μ l H + ,   0, 0. l δ < >   Our model focuses on the impact of 
adverse liquidity shocks on optimal investment and liquidity, refraining from modeling the reasons 
for the shock.  Such a shock may reflect external developments, like a higher foreign interest rate, 
contagion, or a reaction to a signal revealing the future TOT.  For example, suppose that the public 
learns of a signalδ , determining the second period foreign currency earnings from commodity 
exports.  A negative TOT shock may induce anticipation of an economic slowdown, triggering 
capital flights, and reducing deposits from  1 H μ to 1(1 ) Hl μ δ + .  Independently of the exact source of 
the adverse liquidity shock, gestation lags associated with tangible investment and costly liquidation, 
expose the bank to the downside risk associated with abrupt adjustment.  
                                                 
13 Collateral constraints can be shown to arise due to capital market imperfections in the presence of moral 
hazard and costly monitoring [see Holmstrom-Tirole (1996) and Aghion-Banerjee-Piketty (1999)].     Appendix                         4          
      The bank uses reserves to meet the liquid shock and to purchase the non-traded input.  In case 
of need, the liquidly shock may be met by costly liquidation of capital.  Consequently, the ultimate 
capital is: 
 (A3) 
{ } 11 1 1
1
1
(1 ) ( ) , 0 0
0










We assume that the liquidity constraint is binding, and that the marginal productivity of the non 
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, 
where 1 p  may depend on δ.  
   To gain further insight, it is useful to focus on the simplest discrete example, where with 
probability half an adverse liquidity shock of  ε δ − =  (01 ε ≤ < ) would take place, and with 
probability half there would be no liquidity interruption.  The value of ε  corresponds to the volatility 
of the liquidity shock, δ.  The asymmetric nature of tangible investment implies that only negative 
liquidity shocks may require real adjustment.  In these circumstances, the expected profits are: 
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, 
where  11 KK ≥  
Applying the above, the equilibrium is characterized by the following:  
Claim: 
Higher international reserves mitigates the liquidation would occur in the bad state ( 11 KK > ), and 
reduces the real exchange rate depreciation associated with adverse shocks.    Appendix                         5          
Figure A1 

































β β − = ;  Non-liquidated deposits are paid return  f r .  Any non used 
reserves yield return  f r . 
End of period 1: 
Liquidity shock materializes; an adverse shock  0 ; < δ δ  induces deposit drop of  1 () lH δ μ − .   Æ  
Reserves  1 R  are used to finance any liquidity shock and to hire non-traded specific input z (at 1 p ).   
Costly liquidation of capital from 1 K  to  1 1 1; K K K ≤  would boost liquidity by 
0 ); 1 /( ] [ 1 1 ≥ + − θ θ K K . 
Beginning of period 1: 
Entrepreneurs with initial wealth 1 H , subject to collateral constraint μ, use bank financing 1 H μ .   The 
combined liquidity  1 ) 1 ( H μ +  finances investment  1 K  and hoarding reserves,  1 R , 
1 1 1 ) 1 ( R K H + = + μ .   Appendix                         6          
APPENDIX B: DEFINITIONS AND DATA 
Definitions of the series used in the Main text 
 
 Real Effective Exchange Rates (REER) 
The real effective exchange rate index represents a nominal effective exchange rate index adjusted 




i P P e e REER )] / )( / [( Π =  
Where   e: Exchange rate of the subject currency against the US dollar (US dollars per rupee in index 
form)              
ei: Exchange rates of currency i against the US dollar (US dollars per currency i in index 
form)  
wi:   Weights attached to the country/ currency i in the index  
 P: Consumer Price Index (CPI) of Subject country 
   Pi: Consumer price index of country i 
An Increase in REER corresponds to a Real Domestic Appreciation. Data belongs to the IFS 
dataset.
 14 
Trade Openness (TO)  
Trade openness is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by twice the value of GDP, all 
in current U.S. dollars. The final variable TO is defined as a smooth moving average including a 
maximum of 5 past observations of trade openness. Data from IFS and WDI was used to compose 
this index 
Terms of Trade (TOT) 
Net barter terms of trade are the ratio of the export price index to the corresponding import price 
index measured relative to the base year 2000 
Sources:  
1)  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Handbook of International Trade and 
Development Statistics. 
2)  Constructed. We use export and import value data from IFS. We use two kinds of proxies for 
export/import price indices. 
a.   Indices for export and import prices that are compiled from survey data for wholesale 
prices or directly from the exporter or importer (called “direct pricing”). See IFS line 
76.  
b.  Indices for Unit Value of Exports see IFS line 74 and Unit Value of Imports see IFS 
line 75 are Laspeyres, with weights derived from the data for transactions. 
We use indices based on direct pricing when available since these are generally considered 
preferable to unit value indices, because problems of unit value bias are reduced. 
                                                 
14 IFS data has started to report REER data as Divisia Indices. To our best knowledge the REER data used in this study 
follows the previous trade weighted definition. 
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Reserves (RES) 
 
The “Reserves” variable used for the interaction with terms of trade the total stock of Reserves ( 
special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange 
under the control of monetary authorities) where gold holdings are excluded. Data is finally 
converted as the ratio of domestic GDP. The main source for this series is WDI and DataStream 
 
Net Capital Inflows 
 
   FDI:  Foreign Direct Investment captures the net inflows from foreign direct investors to the 
domestic economy 
Portfolio Investment: Portfolio Investment is composed of flows in equity and debt 
considered for portfolio investment 
Other Investment: Other Investment is composed of trade credits, loans, currency and other 
flows. Most of this capital flows are short term 
- Δ INTER. RESERVES: Decrease in Official International Reserves 




1-   RELATIVE INCOME: GDP per Capita relative to the US GDP per capita 
2-  EXMG: Excess Money Growth. Calculate as Money and Quasi-Money (M2) growth rate 
minus GDP (in current US$) growth. 
3-  MANGDP: Percentage of the economic activity captured by the manufacturing sector 
(excluding construction) 
4-  CGDP: Percentage of the economic activity dedicated to the production of commodities 
other than manufactures. 




1-  Simple Panel with Country Fixed Effects 
 
it it i it X ects CountryEff REER ε α + + = * ) ln(  
 
Where α is a vector of (n, 1) estimators and X is a vector (1, n) of independent variables. 
 
2-  Panel with Country Fixed Effects and Quadratic Time Trend 
 
it it i it T T X ects CountryEff REER ε β β α + + + + =
2
2 1 * * * ) ln(  
Where T represents a time trend 
 
3-   Panel with Country Fixed Effects and Time Effects 
 
it it t i it X s TimeEffect ects CountryEff REER ε α + + + = * ) ln(    Appendix                         8          
 
DETRENDING THE REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE 
 
We use the Hodrick-Prescott
 (HP) filter 
15 to test the robustness of the previous regressions results 
against the hypothesis of common trends. Using this filter the de-trended real effective exchange rate 

























Where lambda is the penalty parameter. In the appendix we present results with a lambda = 1600  
 
Country and Year Availability for all subgroups used in the main text 
 
Table B.1 Developing Countries 
 
Country  First  
Year 
Last  
Year  Country  First
 Year
Last




Algeria  1981 2002 Gambia  1981 2002 Pakistan  1980  2004
Argentina  1981 2004 Ghana  1981 2002 Panama  1981  2002
Bolivia  1981 2002 Hungary  1980 2004 Paraguay  1981  2002
Brazil  1980 2004 India  1980 2003 Peru  1981  2002
Bulgaria  1986 1991 Indonesia  1982 2002 Philippines  1981  2003
Burundi  1981 2002 Iran  1996 2000 Poland  1980 2004 
Cameroon  1981 2002 Ireland  1971 2004 Sierra  Leone  1981  2002
Chile  1981 2002 Israel  1975 2004 Singapore  1980  2004
China  1981 2002 Jordan  1980 2004 Solomon  Is.  1978  1988
Colombia  1980 2004 Kenya  1995 2000 South  Africa  1975  2004
Congo  1981 2002 Korea  1971 2004 St.  Lucia  2003  2003
Costa  Rica  1981 2002 Lesotho  1981 2002 Thailand  1980  2004
Côte  d'Ivoire  1981 2002 Malawi  1981 2002 Togo  1981  2002
Cyprus  1980 1987 Malaysia  1981 2002 Trinidad.  &  Tobago 1975  1990
Dominican  Rep  1981 2002 Malta  1975 1989 Tunisia  1981  2002
Ecuador  1981 2002 Mexico  1981  2002 Turkey  1981  2004
Egypt  1981 2002 Morocco  1980 2002 Uganda  1983  2002
Equatorial  Guinea 1986 2002 Nicaragua 1988 2002 Uruguay  1981  2002
Fiji  1980 1988 Nigeria  1981 2002 Venezuela  1981  2002







                                                 
15 Hodrick, R. J., and Prescott, E. C., "Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation." Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking 29 (1),Feb. 1997, 1-16. 
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Table B.2 Selected OECD Countries 
 
 
Country  First Year  Last Year Country  First Year Last Year 
Australia  1972 2004 Japan  1971 2004 
Austria  1971 1993 Netherlands  1971 2004 
Belgium  1994 2004 New  Zealand  1971 2004 
Canada  1971 2004 Norway  1971 2004 
Denmark  1971 2004 Portugal  1984 2003 
Finland  1971 2004 Spain  1971 2004 
France  1991 2004 Sweden  1971 2004 
Germany  1971 2004 Switzerland  1971 1987 
Iceland  1971 1997 United  Kingdom 1972 2004 







Table B.3 Regions 
 



















Export Composition: The two subgroups of countries under Manufactures and Natural Resources 
exporters are selected based in the following criteria 
-Consistently in the top 20 ranking of countries with the highest net External Balance 
  -Net Export Balance Always positive for all sub periods 
- Manufactures exporters must have a negative balance for net exports of commodities. 
- Natural Resources exporters must have a negative balance for net exports of manufactures. 
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Net Exports of Manufactures (% of GDP) 
 
     
Country  1970-76 1977-83 1984-90 1991-97  1998-04 
Korea  1.83 8.67 9.51 5.11  11.65 
Finland   3.61  1.93  7.09  10.05 
Germany  8.96 8.73 8.85 4.71  7.18 
Sweden  1.86 3.47 3.12 4.68  7.08 
Belgium  6.00 3.43 5.01 6.11  5.85 
Japan  7.83 8.99 6.96 5.01  4.84 
Italy  5.01 6.25 3.83 5.01  4.35 











Net Exports Natural Resources (% GDP) 
Country  1970-76 1977-83 1984-90 1991-97  1998-04 
Oman  19.70 12.69 20.62 31.18  39.52 
Kuwait  67.63 48.50 13.13 32.78  39.51 
Nigeria  21.88 28.46 33.74 26.05  39.30 
Saudi Arabia  47.07 49.87 15.62 30.97  24.94 
Algeria  23.08 23.40 13.56 19.41  23.49 
Russia      6.89 19.53 
Norway  0.87 9.65  10.92  13.40  18.41 
Venezuela  22.19 19.30 17.85 18.27  16.13 
Chile  8.88 7.53  12.77  9.93  9.23 
Australia  3.66 2.91 4.95 4.61  4.88 
Canada  4.88 4.68 4.39 4.67  4.68 
South Africa  4.57 3.87 1.38 1.80  2.12 
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Measures of Relative Volatility for the REER and the different Shocks 
 
Table B.6 Relative Volatility of the Shocks (measure as standard deviation of the log 
differences) 
 
   D(Log REER)  D(Log TOT*TO) D(Log TOT)  D(Log RESERVES)
ALL Countries  0.115 0.029  0.1248  0.0256 
Developing countries  0.131 0.0355  0.149 0.0287 
Industrial countries  0.0483 0.0098  0.0522 0.0129 
Manufactures Exporters  0.0566 0.0099  0.0487 0.0135 
Natural Resources Exporters  0.1439 0.0353  0.1526 0.0276 
LATAM  0.1614 0.0211  0.1292 0.0222 
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Pooled Unit Root Test for the Series used in the Main Text 
In this section we test our REER and TOT* Reserves series for unit roots using estimators of a panel 
unit root test developed by Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC, 2002).  The test assumes that each individual 
unit in the panel shares the same AR(1) coefficient, but allows for individual effects, time effects and 
possibly a time trend. The test may be viewed as a pooled Dickey-Fuller test, or an Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test when lags are included, with the null hypothesis that of nonstationarity 
(I(1) behavior). After transformation by factors provided by LLC, the t-star statistic is distributed 
standard normal under the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. 
 
 
Table B.7.1: Results from an ADF test on the log of REER 
coefficient t-value t-star  Lags  Trend 
-0.16212 -18.457  -7.62705  2 No 
-0.14916 -18.705  -9.15011  1 No 
-0.27354 -22.114  -4.01753  1 Yes 
Regressions are based on a balanced panel of 96 countries over the period 1980-2003 
 
Table B.7.2: Results from an ADF test on the Interaction TOT*Reserves 
coefficient t-value t-star  Lags  Trend 
-0.17182 -10.888  -3.94686  2 No 
-0.18008 -11.491  -4.63357  1 No 
-0.52963 -20.68  -6.9924  1  Yes 
Regressions are based on a balanced panel of 60 countries over the period 1980-2002 
 
Summary of results: 
Tables B.7.1 and B.7.2 show the results of our pooled ADF test under different specifications 
(number of lags and the inclusion of time trends) for our REER series and the interacted variable of 
TOT and Reserves used in the econometric analysis. Although both series show a remarkably high 
persistence (AR (1) coefficients above .7 for both series without trend), we are able to reject the null 
of non-stationarity at a 1% confidence level in both tests.  
 
References: 
Levin, Andrew, Lin, Chien-Fu and Chia-Shang James Chu: “Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: 
Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties”. Journal of Econometrics, 108, 1-24, 2002. 
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Robustness Test of Table 1 in the Main Text Using Lagged Variables 
Table B.8 tell us that our results are robust to the inclusion of lagged variables 
 
Table B.8: REER vs. Lagged effective Terms of Trade and Mitigation through Reserve 
Accumulation 
Dependent 
Variable:  ln(REER)  All Developing  Industrial  Manufactures 
Natural 
Resources  LATAM ASIA 
Lagged  Effective TOT  1.773*** 1.806***  0.784  0.23  4.362***  1.205  1.762 
  [0.278] [0.289] [0.581]  [1.895]  [0.759]  [0.827]  [1.103] 
Lagged Effective TOT * Stock 
of Reserves  -3.557*** -3.633***  0.988  6.282  -11.528*  4.654  -4.024* 
  [0.887] [0.910] [4.573]  [21.767]  [6.473]  [10.059]  [2.388] 
Observations  1852 1263  589  262  252 343 201 
R-Squared  0.4465 0.4302 0.5947  0.4027  0.6165  0.3898  0.2047 
Years  1970-2004 1970-2004 1970-2004  1970-2004 1970-2004  1980-2004 1970-2004 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX C: REER vs. TERMS OF TRADE SHOCKS 
Table C.1:  Different specifications for subsets of countries 
Countries Specification  Dependent  
Variable  TOT SE  TOT 
 * Reserves  SE T  T
2  Obs. R
2 
All  Country Effects  Log REER  1.802***  [0.244] -3.873***  [0.746]      1863  0.4549 
  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  1.513***  [0.223] -4.304***  [0.675] -0.008*  0  1863  0.4955 
  CE + TE  Log REER  1.247***  [0.205] -3.513***  [0.662]      1863  0.5324 
  HP (1600)  TREER  0.487***  [0.138] -1.729***  [0.531]      1863  0.0379 
All Lagged  Country Effects  Log REER  1.773***  [0.278] -3.557***  [0.887]      1852  0.4465 
  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  1.483***  [0.259] -3.877***  [0.827] -0.006  0  1852  0.4874 
  CE + TE  Log REER  1.260***  [0.241] -3.410***  [0.804]      1852  0.5249 
  HP (1600)  TREER  0.527***  [0.174]  -1.401**  [0.627]      1852  0.0327 
Developing  Country Effects  Log REER  1.836***  [0.255] -3.937***  [0.766]      1260  0.4367 
  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  1.047***  [0.215]  -4.281*** [0.766]  -0.079*** 0.001*** 1260  0.5535 
  CE + TE  Log REER  0.917***  [0.201] -3.612***  [0.679]      1260  0.581 
  HP (1600)  TREER  0.464***  [0.143] -1.688***  [0.539]      1260  0.038 
Developing   Country Effects  Log REER  1.806***  [0.289] -3.633***  [0.910]      1263  0.4302 
Lagged  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  1.093***  [0.254]  -3.885*** [0.867]  -0.071*** 0.001*** 1263  0.5367 
  CE + TE  Log REER  0.970***  [0.239] -3.500***  [0.812]      1263  0.57 
  HP (1600)  TREER  0.510***  [0.180]  -1.375**  [0.639]      1263  0.0323 
Industrial  Country Effects  Log REER  0.95  [0.594] -1.603  [4.607]      603  0.5947 
  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  1.322**  [0.590]  -1.969 [4.766]  0.009***  -0.000***  603  0.6085 
  CE + TE  Log REER  1.581**  [0.632]  -4.13  [4.834]      603  0.6232 
  HP (1600)  TREER  1.030***  [0.213]  -2.853  [2.274]      603  0.0532 
Industrial  Country Effects  Log REER  0.784  [0.581] 0.988  [4.573]      589  0.5947 
 Lagged  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  1.168**  [0.573] 0.301  [4.686]  0.009***  -0.000***  589  0.6066 
  CE + TE  Log REER  1.314**  [0.609]  -0.76  [4.631]      589  0.6223 
  HP (1600)  TREER  0.902***  [0.210]  -1.211  [2.129]      589  0.049 
Manufactures  Country Effects  Log REER  0.442  [2.077] 12.269 [23.668]      271  0.4066 
 Exporters  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  0.823  [2.151] -1.914 [25.259] -0.016  0  271  0.4429 
  CE + TE  Log REER  -0.813  [2.868] 6.139 [28.984]     271  0.4507 
  HP (1600)  TREER  1.013*  [0.530]  -9.594  [6.013]      271  0.0211 
Manufactures  Country Effects  Log REER  0.23  [1.895] 6.282 [21.767]      262  0.4027 
Exporters  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  0.678  [1.974] -8.498 [22.474] -0.015  0  262  0.4416 
Lagged  CE + TE  Log REER  -1.321  [2.687] -1.659 [25.778]     262  0.4543 
  HP (1600)  TREER  0.425  [0.497]  -1.4  [6.190]      262  0.0098 
Natural   Country Effects  Log REER  4.376***  [0.779] -10.676  [7.013]      253  0.6162 
Resources  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  3.994***  [0.756] -12.613**  [6.350] -0.009  0  253  0.6579 
Exporters  CE + TE  time effect  3.491***  [0.854] -8.006  [6.414]      253  0.6831 
  HP (1600)  TREER  2.194***  [0.613] -15.144***  [5.320]      253  0.1221 
Natural   Country Effects  Log REER  4.362***  [0.759] -11.528*  [6.473]      252  0.6165 
Resources  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  3.962***  [0.756] -12.622**  [6.299] -0.011*  0  252  0.6537 
Exporters  CE + TE  Log REER  3.523***  [0.844]  -7.271  [6.282]      252  0.6813 
Lagged  HP (1600)  TREER  2.221***  [0.601] -12.595***  [4.779]      252  0.1465 
LATAM  Country Effects  Log REER  1.642**  [0.802] -0.537  [9.164]      343  0.3903 
  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  0.65  [0.832]  4.444 [8.659]  -0.083***  0.002***  343  0.4287 
  CE + TE  Log REER  0.606  [0.813]  6.164  [8.355]      343  0.5198 
  HP (1600)  TREER  0.408  [0.586]  4.251  [6.306]      343  0.0226 
LATAM  Country Effects  Log REER  1.205  [0.827] 4.654 [10.059]      343  0.3898 
Lagged  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  0.686  [0.793]  7.282 [9.548]  -0.064***  0.001***  343  0.413 
  CE + TE  Log REER  0.662  [0.758]  8.174  [8.891]      343  0.5202 
  HP (1600)  TREER  0.154  [0.532]  8.365  [7.158]      343  0.029 
ASIA  Country Effects  Log REER  2.269**  [1.104] -4.672**  [2.280]      202  0.2161 
  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  1.752***  [0.512]  -6.619*** [1.624]  -0.164*** 0.003*** 202 0.8368 
  CE + TE  Log REER  1.551***  [0.495] -6.605***  [1.385]      202  0.8894 
  HP (1600)  TREER  0.216  [0.343]  -0.331  [0.744]      202  0.0071 
ASIA  Country Effects  Log REER  1.762  [1.103] -4.024*  [2.388]      201  0.2047 
Lagged  CE + Time Trend  Log REER  1.413***  [0.512]  -6.229*** [1.668]  -0.158*** 0.003*** 201 0.8289 
  CE + TE  Log REER  1.385***  [0.479] -6.395***  [1.427]      201  0.8883 
  HP (1600)  TREER  0.016  [0.342]  0.006  [0.807]      201  0.004   Appendix                         15          







Terms of  







Algeria  0.921 [1.795]  36.452  [21.306]  23 0.4137 3.393279  12.91223  0.0902 
Argentina  44.994 [6.597]***  -793.738  [113.969]***  25  0.5594  -0.76438  -27.4739  0.0099 
Australia  10.149 [0.921]***  -63.007  [16.952]*** 33  0.7871  7.626154  6.907381  0.0206 
Austria  16.803 [13.353]  -280.526  [187.404] 24  0.2939  -4.74984  3.230961  0.0093 
Belgium  -1.367 [4.695]  57.881  [83.458] 12 0.3227  1.998743 0.988936 0.0108 
Bolivia  1.345 [1.846]  77.249  [37.692]*  23 0.8385 7.190718  8.426918  0.0649 
Brazil  -6.046 [2.192]**  -18.407  [44.493]  25  0.3863  -7.04516  -7.428  0.0216 
Burundi  5.154 [0.617]***  -32.071  [4.999]*** 23  0.7434  1.000668  2.818424  0.0488 
Cameroon  0.264 [1.907]  -182.262  [106.348]  23 0.0874  0.09035 -8.05198  0.0216 
Canada  5.257 [4.535]  -211.588  [172.354]  35 0.0487 -0.84815  -3.9066 0.0105 
Chile  8.436 [1.561]***  -50.188  [13.080]***  23  0.6338  -1.46511  -0.97332  0.0517 
China  38.103 [17.606]**  -431.96  [153.822]** 23  0.2259  -7.19028  -56  0.0087 
Colombia  1.587 [10.937]  73.252  [78.815] 25 0.3741  9.439636 10.32927 0.0194 
Congo, Republic of  2.428 [0.939]**  36.857  [32.604] 23  0.3657  2.941388  3.44642  0.1159 
Costa Rica  -2.085 [4.334]  28.723  [44.425] 23  0.101  0.56918  0.451427 0.0364 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.582 [0.478]  -37.471  [21.887]  23  0.26  -0.49561 -3.87651  0.0848 
Cyprus  -7.907 [10.673]  25.031  [51.539]  8  0.8416  -3.7336  -2.45531  0.0166 
Denmark  -6.698 [1.877]***  148.646  [28.909]*** 35  0.4637  4.880927  12.60173  0.0116 
Dominican Rep.  3.155 [1.945]  -65.165  [48.125]  23 0.1681 0.830061 1.07641 0.0514 
Ecuador  7.158 [1.322]***  -46.25  [21.816]** 23  0.66  3.386239  5.400608  0.0573 
Egypt  2 [0.844]**  -63.281  [14.008]***  23  0.3746  -10.2414  -7.00149  0.0600 
Equatorial Guinea  0.487 [0.347]  -4.054  [2.560] 18 0.1799 0.412928  0.135584  0.1573 
Fiji  2.156 [1.907]  -31.649  [11.505]**  9 0.7802 -3.40377 -3.81525  0.0541 
Finland  0.065 [2.972]  9.376  [61.627]  35 0.0065 0.688312  0.671141  0.0166 
France  4.912 [3.829]  -337.649  [272.996]  15 0.1407 -2.68579 -2.22818  0.0061 
Gabon  2.381 [0.578]***  -14.162  [9.728]  23  0.4263  1.973659  1.929885  0.1306 
Gambia, The  -2.987 [2.355]  184.589  [92.015]*  23 0.2859  38.18945 35.59034 0.0567 
Germany  -1.786 [3.076]  47.037  [57.857] 34 0.0779  -0.08829 -0.64367 0.0185 
Ghana  19.626 [6.744]***  -140.716  [148.911]  23  0.5838  9.341858  4.979629  0.0508 
Hungary  -13.193 [2.128]***  39.43  [29.032]  22  0.5405  -7.06913  -6.5527  0.0351 
Iceland  7.548 [1.771]***  -97.397  [22.108]***  28  0.3312  1.873382  1.844021  0.0154 
India  -47.612 [4.233]***  516.252  [63.435]*** 24  0.7087  -25.3773  16.04066  0.0097 
Indonesia  7.108 [1.623]***  1.197  [26.197]  22  0.7613  7.220985  7.280557  0.0574 
Ireland  2.829 [2.047]  -21.415  [11.969]*  35 0.1355 0.770717  2.002309  0.0218 
Israel  -4.289 [3.490]  42.098  [22.733]*  30 0.2438  0.925048 4.132718 0.0211 
Italy  2.696 [1.258]**  -37.944  [28.131] 35  0.1082  1.424221 1.887972 0.0202 
Japan  2.013 [6.441]  -226.311  [111.787]*  35 0.2281  -6.0853  -24.3248  0.0207 
Jordan  -11.637 [1.136]***  31.755  [3.878]***  25  0.745  -4.55274  -0.30726  0.0320 
Kenya  -2.892 [5.163]  49.464  [71.037] 6  0.1051  -0.30107 1.541209 0.0550 
Korea  3.157 [7.419]  17.626  [64.699]  35 0.0411 4.417353  6.858481  0.0329 
Lesotho  4.827 [2.104]**  -34.683  [15.980]**  23  0.0731  -6.46674  -8.57529 0.0584 
Malawi  2.413 [0.402]***  16.927  [8.022]**  23  0.7628  3.643276  4.01933  0.0576 
Malaysia  -4.505 [1.120]***  15.158  [6.231]**  23  0.638  -0.58792  0.622804  0.0744 
Malta  -1.825 [0.873]*  0.604  [1.557]  15 0.5911  -1.57121  -1.59734 0.0409 
Mexico  3.841 [2.048]*  -177.211  [71.729]**  23 0.1901  -5.69239 -9.71975 0.0360   Appendix                         16          
Morocco  1.864 [2.354]  -6.042  [20.203]  23 0.0964 1.172524  0.458257  0.0266 
Netherlands  -3.163 [2.211]  31.075  [39.964] 35 0.1032  -1.14995 -2.47822 0.0096 
New Zealand  -0.293 [1.191]  29.575  [12.954]**  35 0.1966  1.90258  1.423403 0.0195 
Nicaragua  -2.581 [12.768]  -25.065  [144.098] 15  0.1056  -4.48777  -5.43802  0.0446 
Nigeria  6.648 [1.369]***  -22.726  [11.276]* 23  0.5821  4.10128  2.638195  0.1208 
Norway  0.038 [0.322]  0.974  [2.415] 35 0.0176 0.165762  0.185171  0.0377 
Oman  -4.682 [2.068]  28.299  [11.851] 5  0.5314  -0.38616  -0.9774  0.1053 
Pakistan  0.587 [3.905]  180.263  [77.974]**  25 0.3399 4.372123 14.9713 0.0182 
Panama  -3.72 [3.471]  22.188  [55.815]  23  0.1292 -1.88255 -2.11735  0.0192 
Paraguay  8.33 [8.402]  -122.221  [69.753]*  23  0.5248 -4.77552  -6.37776  0.0266 
Peru  -12.423 [2.465]***  22.793  [34.700]  23  0.7537  -9.64043  -8.94619  0.0357 
Philippines  -6.201 [1.468]***  47.298  [13.514]*** 24  0.4473  -1.85904  1.280084  0.0258 
Poland  -1.247 [1.057]  144.776  [37.645]***  20 0.6573  11.89795 18.95151 0.0986 
Portugal  3.339 [1.700]*  -1.431  [28.072] 21  0.304  3.12042  3.246945 0.0166 
Sierra Leone  -2.809 [0.761]***  56.415  [25.622]** 23  0.4102  -0.77461  1.684829  0.1235 
Singapore  0.536 [0.635]  -0.898  [1.299] 26 0.0315 -0.00389 -0.06588  0.1065 
Solomon Is.  1.09 [0.931]  -0.413  [3.931]  11  0.5372  1.055265  1.033999  0.1221 
South Africa  8.363 [2.463]***  -295.929  [134.140]**  30  0.2885  3.054353  -6.1382  0.0157 
Spain  -0.231 [3.198]  15.579  [49.158] 35 0.0196  1.08814  0.361527 0.0191 
Sweden  5.904 [1.963]***  -56.652  [43.973]  35  0.2698  1.730086  2.326805  0.0171 
Switzerland  9.758 [15.266]  -30.977  [114.031]  18  0.458  5.908318 5.655074 0.0151 
Thailand  6.832 [1.849]***  -21.225  [9.096]**  25  0.6472  2.888231  1.507516  0.0348 
Togo  5.85 [2.320]**  -5.524  [8.320] 23 0.6351 5.221563 5.215947  0.0361 
Trinidad & Tobago  3.6 [1.024]***  -11.309  [2.946]***  16 0.6144 2.671946  1.352825  0.1018 
Tunisia  12.562 [3.598]***  -121.252  [48.821]**  23  0.5939  2.970556  -0.27149  0.0246 
Turkey  -10.378 [3.447]***  34.234  [44.545]  25  0.2378  -8.10595  -6.19887  0.0083 
Uganda  5.419 [1.432]***  -33.319  [21.326]  21  0.4698  3.20476  0.290683  0.0591 
United Kingdom  23.715 [8.824]**  -603.084  [210.701]***  33  0.2138  4.118539  8.682902  0.0091 
United States  14.147  [5.898]**  -2,132.26  [1,255]* 35 0.1093  -5.39353 0.801306 0.0039 
Uruguay  -4.075 [10.680]  -25.147  [159.464] 23  0.1165  -5.57496  -7.47942  0.0138 
Venezuela  1.247 [2.049]  16.333  [17.311]  23 0.4222 3.505121  3.197085  0.0672 
Zambia  0.459 [0.827]  -30.488  [18.780]  23 0.2087 -0.96593 -1.81874  0.0847 
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Trade   
Terms of  
Trade 




  Obs. R-squared 
Algeria  -0.593 [2.099]  -11.949  [14.170]  -0.187  [0.158]  0.002  [0.003] 23  0.8108 
Argentina  54.019 [7.178]*** -896.022 [159.674]***  -0.059  [0.056]  0.001  [0.001]  25  0.6481 
Australia  7.669 [1.303]***  -43.5  [13.355]***  0.003  [0.007]  0  [0.000]  33  0.8549 
Austria  6.275 [4.266] -60.431  [59.229]  0.019 [0.002]***  0  [0.000]***  24 0.9197 
Belgium  -4.248 [3.838]  86.046  [57.759]  -0.098  [0.044]* 0.002 [0.001]*  12  0.5384 
Bolivia  6.857 [5.645]  42.717  [37.459]  0.18  [0.183] -0.003 [0.003]  23 0.8621 
Brazil  -13.804 [2.099]***  44.627  [31.061]  0.108  [0.026]***  -0.003  [0.001]*** 25  0.7601 
Burundi  4.107  [0.901]***  -26.3 [6.915]*** -0.05 [0.034]  0.001  [0.001]  23  0.7861 
Cameroon  0.612 [1.383] -65.803 [117.333]  0.075  [0.038]*  -0.002  [0.001]**  23 0.5346 
Canada  -1.577  [3.760] 42.348 [113.089] -0.009 [0.006]  0  [0.000]  35  0.7587 
Chile  4.429 [5.158] -15.191  [27.169]  -0.122  [0.103]  0.003  [0.002]  23 0.7408 
China  -11.115 [5.714]*  178.811  [54.470]***  -0.34  [0.026]***  0.006  [0.001]***  23  0.9537 
Colombia  -4.748 [10.760]  79.185  [75.440]  -0.089  [0.042]**  0.002  [0.001]* 25  0.6127 
Congo  0.276 [0.766]  12.094  [26.950]  -0.408 [0.070]***  0.009  [0.002]***  23 0.6638 
Costa Rica  3.351 [3.675] -19.205  [36.258]  -0.094 [0.036]** 0.002 [0.001]**  23 0.3527 
Côte d'Ivoire  -0.222  [0.644]  -6.146  [21.889]  0.03  [0.035] -0.001 [0.001]  23 0.3731 
Cyprus  -2.048 [6.226]  3.173  [30.331]  -0.042  [0.036]  0.001  [0.001] 8  0.9794 
Denmark  -2.321 [1.371]  80.254 [21.309]***  0.01  [0.002]***  0  [0.000]***  35  0.7246 
Dominican Rep.  -0.506 [0.766]  -19.219  [18.263]  -0.188 [0.022]*** 0.004  [0.000]***  23  0.8129 
Ecuador  3.525 [2.500] -55.423 [18.265]*** -0.224 [0.076]***  0.004  [0.001]***  23 0.7686 
Egypt  2.051 [1.983] -83.081 [14.829]***  0.155 [0.053]***  -0.004  [0.001]***  23 0.6463 
Equatorial Guinea  -0.072  [0.063]  -0.801 [1.170] -0.244  [0.034]***  0.004  [0.001]***  18  0.8857 
Fiji  0.208 [0.765]  -2.15  [10.640]  0.384  [0.174]* -0.014 [0.006]*  9  0.94 
Finland  4.324 [1.642]** -86.336  [33.027]**  0.027  [0.005]*** -0.001 [0.000]***  35  0.6209 
France  8.297 [3.878]* -304.52  [224.088]  0.015  [0.024]  0  [0.000] 15  0.6209 
Gabon  -0.397  [0.413]  -4.024 [4.084] -0.052  [0.035]  0  [0.001]  23  0.8873 
Gambia, The  -1.377 [1.077]  71.793  [53.577]  -0.005  [0.033]  0  [0.001] 23  0.7721 
Germany  12.296 [3.716]*** -178.965  [67.778]**  0.001  [0.003]  0  [0.000]** 34  0.6417 
Ghana  1.824 [5.747] -82.165  [64.175]  -0.582 [0.219]** 0.01 [0.004]**  23 0.8622 
Hungary  -6.456 [1.626]***  45.028  [12.009]***  -0.064  [0.017]***  0.002  [0.000]*** 22  0.9063 
Iceland  6.789 [1.306]*** -92.396  [16.793]***  0.011  [0.003]***  0  [0.000]***  28  0.6859 
India  -3.414  [8.929] 0.05 [100.140]  -0.122  [0.059]*  0.002  [0.001]  24  0.9117 
Indonesia  3.965 [2.258]*  -1.356  [24.358]  -0.03  [0.066]  0  [0.001] 22  0.9269 
Ireland  1.676 [2.043]  -6.55  [14.844]  0.008  [0.004]*  0  [0.000]  35 0.2568 
Israel  -5.9 [3.961] 46.938 [24.268]*  0.003 [0.013]  0  [0.000]  30  0.2718 
Italy  5.487 [1.412]***  -57.99  [31.090]*  0.009  [0.006]  0  [0.000]* 35  0.3372 
Japan  5.743 [1.152]*** -59.678  [20.164]***  0.088  [0.006]*** -0.002 [0.000]***  35  0.9545 
Jordan  -9.576 [2.108]***  35.605  [6.578]***  -0.113  [0.054]**  0.002  [0.001]** 25  0.8383 
Korea  2.567 [1.328]*  6.598  [13.004]  -0.223 [0.004]*** 0.004 [0.000]***  35  0.9871 
Lesotho  3.227 [1.906] -18.825  [13.545]  0.09  [0.025]***  -0.002  [0.001]***  23 0.8068 
Malawi  2.147 [0.655]***  10.831  [8.206]  0.035  [0.023]  -0.001  [0.000]* 23  0.8098 
Malaysia  -1.378 [1.452]  6.486  [5.278]  -0.039  [0.047]  0  [0.001] 23  0.8059 
Malta  -0.639  [2.276]  -2.836 [2.943] -0.067  [0.032]*  0.002  [0.001]*  15  0.7584 
Mexico  4.134 [3.096] -126.801 [62.869]*  -0.05  [0.074]  0.001  [0.001]  23 0.4316 
Morocco  -0.882  [0.662]  -1.684 [9.778] -0.117  [0.011]***  0.002  [0.000]***  23  0.8821 
Netherlands  -13.419 [2.259]***  205.82  [42.912]***  0  [0.002]  0  [0.000]  35  0.4922 
New Zealand  0.999 [1.031]  12.477  [11.830]  -0.003  [0.005]  0  [0.000]  35 0.2832 
Nicaragua  1.551 [7.660] -29.756  [64.320]  0.947 [0.258]***  -0.017  [0.005]***  15 0.7077 
Nigeria  3.918 [2.314] -30.485 [8.182]***  -0.243  [0.183]  0.004  [0.004]  23 0.7415 
Norway  -0.155  [0.362]  4.803 [3.032] 0.011  [0.003]***  0  [0.000]***  35  0.3457 
Pakistan  -0.771 [0.933]  61.619 [19.138]***  -0.118 [0.018]*** 0.002  [0.000]***  25  0.9543 
Panama  -2.602 [1.375]*  27.437  [18.871]  -0.054 [0.010]*** 0.001 [0.000]***  23  0.9219 
Paraguay  3.397  [6.521]  -23.29 [46.954] -0.149  [0.034]***  0.003  [0.001]***  23  0.8138 
Peru  9.721 [8.701] -69.043  [53.452]  0.322 [0.108]***  -0.005  [0.002]***  23 0.8558 
Philippines  -2.942 [1.229]**  8.891  [15.022]  -0.064  [0.023]**  0.001  [0.001]** 24  0.7073 
Poland  -4.705  [2.154]**  167.475  [50.107]***  0.258  [0.168] -0.004 [0.003]  20 0.8324 
Portugal  -3.348 [1.074]***  33.891  [15.780]**  0.054  [0.015]***  -0.001  [0.000]** 21  0.9092 
Sierra Leone  0.145 [1.462]  18  [32.397]  -0.133  [0.081]  0.002  [0.002]  23  0.615 
Singapore  1.245 [1.129]  0.465  [2.425]  0  [0.024]  0  [0.001]  26 0.2692   Appendix                         18          
Solomon Is.  0.113 [0.288]  -0.732  [0.905]  0.277 [0.063]***  -0.011  [0.002]***  11 0.9152 
South Africa  -7.621 [2.695]*** 519.109 [123.963]***  0.023  [0.013]  -0.001 [0.000]***  30  0.8161 
Spain  1.887 [2.792] -11.199  [44.469]  0.026 [0.005]***  -0.001  [0.000]***  35 0.5914 
Sweden  0.245 [2.124]  33.193  [47.220]  -0.008  [0.005]  0  [0.000]  35 0.8377 
Switzerland  -12.134 [3.651]***  118.98  [25.403]***  0.069  [0.005]***  -0.003  [0.000]*** 18  0.9494 
Thailand  -5.201 [2.233]**  24.879  [8.783]**  -0.054  [0.015]*** 0.001  [0.000]  25  0.8616 
Togo  2.772  [1.455]*  -5.445 [2.873]* -0.038  [0.015]** 0  [0.000]  23  0.8823 
Trinidad & Tobago  3.32 [0.543]*** -10.281  [1.318]***  0.14  [0.016]***  -0.005  [0.001]***  16  0.9285 
Tunisia  1.442 [2.245] -50.018  [24.401]*  -0.116 [0.018]***  0.002  [0.000]***  23 0.9231 
Turkey  -3.052 [4.502]  54.224  [41.894]  -0.114 [0.019]*** 0.002  [0.000]***  25  0.6665 
Uganda  -0.049 [1.555]  2.785  [15.073]  -0.153 [0.047]*** 0.002 [0.001]*  21  0.7044 
United Kingdom  17.346 [5.964]*** -363.271  [161.525]**  0.011  [0.006]*  0  [0.000]  33  0.5485 
United States  13.989 [15.745] -2,275.21 [3,024.243]  -0.003  [0.015]  0  [0.000]  35  0.1177 
Uruguay  0.573 [4.915]  -29.08  [82.966]  -0.13  [0.048]** 0.003 [0.001]**  23 0.4707 
Venezuela.  -1.389 [1.829]  18.338  [10.202]*  -0.28  [0.101]** 0.006  [0.002]***  23  0.7757 
Zambia  -1.259  [0.832]  -0.662 [13.986] -0.102  [0.038]**  0.002  [0.001]**  23  0.4368 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
*************************************** 
Inclusion of Controls to our Main Equation 
In this section we control for the differences in the foreign exchange regimes across countries. To do so, 
we divide our sample following Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification of FOREX Regimes (see below, 




1  •No separate legal tender 
2  •Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement 
3  •Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
4  •De facto peg 
5  •Pre announced crawling peg 
6  •Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
7  •De factor crawling peg 
8  •De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
9  •Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% 
10  •De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% 
11  •Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both     
appreciation and depreciation over time) 
12 •Managed  floating 
13 •Freely  floating 
The sample is divided between observations under relatively fixed exchange rate regimes (RR code < 9) 
and observations under relatively floating regimes (RR code 9 or higher). 
 
Table C.4: Controlling for the Foreign Exchange Rate Regime 
 
Dependent Variable: REER  All Countries    Developing Countries    Industrial Countries   
FOREX Regime  Floating  Fixed  Floating  Fixed  Floating  Fixed 
Effective TOT  3.374*** 1.028***  3.500***  1.011***  2.235***  0.715 
  [0.523] [0.231]  [0.573]  [0.242]  [0.673]  [0.772] 
Effective TOT * Stock of Reserves  -7.571*** -3.982***  -7.668***  -3.981***  -8.306*  8.851 
  [2.169] [0.980]  [2.322]  [0.997]  [4.951]  [12.878] 
Observations  524 899  292  567  232  332 
R-squared  0.6239 0.5886  0.5826  0.4952  0.6255  0.8308 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Summary of results:  
Table C.4 indicates that developing countries under more flexible forex regimes will find a larger role 




To further analyze the uncovered buffer effect of liquid foreign assets on TOT shocks we divide the 
main regression by the nature of the TOT shock (positive of negative). 
 
Table C.5 Symmetry of Terms of Trade Shocks and Reserves Buffer Effect 
 
Dependent Variable: REER  All Countries    Developing Countries    Industrial Countries   
Nature of TOT shock  Positive  Negative  Positive  Negative  Positive  Negative 
Effective TOT  1.391*** 2.483***  1.376***  2.588***  1.222*  0.943 
  [0.384] [0.383]  [0.449]  [0.409]  [0.626]  [0.674] 
Effective TOT* Stock of Reserves  -2.772* -5.486***  -2.827*  -5.709***  5.087  -4.124 
  [1.428] [1.128]  [1.568]  [1.185]  [7.803]  [5.239] 
Observations  858 933  533  613  325  320 
R-squared  0.4453 0.5005  0.4077  0.4763  0.5872  0.6359 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Summary of results:  
The results displayed in Table C.5 show that the buffer effect of reserves in developing countries seems 
to be larger given a deteriorations of the countries terms of trade. Nevertheless, given the standard errors 
is difficult to reject the hypothesis of symmetry across both coefficients. 
*************************************** 
Have reserves changed their role as ETOT shock absorbers after the 1997 global turmoil? To answer this 
question a simple test consists of splitting the interaction between ETOT and Reserves into two covering 
the periods before 1997 and after 1998 then using a simple Wald test to compare the slopes on those 
coefficients the table below shows the results of a panel regression with country fixed effects. Reserves 
are always in terms of domestic GDP. We also include the level of reserves to control for significant 
changes in the volume of international liquidity between periods. F statistics corresponding to the Wald 
tests are shown at the bottom of the table. 
 
Summary of results:  
From the Wald test applied to the coefficients on table C.6 we determine that the slope of the buffer 
effect of reserves did not significantly changed after the 1997 financial crisis for developing countries in 
general. However, the Wald test indicates differences between pre 97 and post 97 slopes for the different 
subgroups. Reserves seem to play a more relevant role after 1997 for Latin American and Commodity 
exporters. Although the results show a higher role of reserves before 1997 for Asian economies, this 
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Table C.6 Role of Reserves Before and After the 1997 Asian Crisis 
 









Effective TOT  1.754*** 1.740***  1.191**  1.606**  2.062**  4.810***  -2.019 
 
  [0.239] [0.261]  [0.496]  [0.789]  [0.860] [0.717]  [1.803] 
ETOT * Stock  
of Reserves* Post 1997  -5.072*** -5.647***  5.753  -25.463**  -4.075** -27.286***  5.384 
 
  [1.620] [1.699]  [6.182]  [10.215]  [1.586] [5.612]  [26.791] 
ETOT * Stock  
of Reserves* Pre 1997  -3.432*** -3.243***  -1.808  3.175  -9.210*** -15.005*  42.154* 
 
  [0.837] [0.917]  [5.009]  [9.304]  [2.304] [7.692]  [23.281] 
Stock of Reserves  -1.093*** -1.263***  0.525**  0.235  -2.941*** -3.013***  -2.565*** 
 
  [0.126] [0.139]  [0.226]  [0.599]  [0.310] [0.420]  [0.860] 
Observations 
  1863 1217  646  343  202  253  271 
R-squared 
  0.4743 0.4522  0.6028  0.3966  0.3536 0.6996  0.438 
Wald Test             
H0: Effective Terms of Trade * Stock of Reserves Pre 1997 = Effective Terms of Trade * Stock of Reserves Post 1997 
F Statistic  0.76 1.43  3.97  8.58  11.16  5.24  1.2 
Prob > F  0.3847 0.2319  0.0469  0.0036  0.001  0.0229  0.2739 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Post 1997 (Pre 1997) corresponds to a dummy variable with value 1 if the year is above 1997 (below or equal to) 1997 and 0 
otherwise.    
 
*************************************** 
Financial depth seems to be important to determine the degree in which reserves help absorb 
external shocks. To highlight this finding we divide our between observations of relatively low 
domestic liquidity (less than twenty percent of total output) and relatively high liquidity (more than 
twenty percent of total output). We observe that the buffer effect of international reserves seems to 
be stronger when countries face shallow financial systems. 
 
Table C.7: Reserves as shock absorbers under deep and shallow financial markets 
 
Dependent Variable LREER  M2 >20% of GDP  M2 < 20 % of GDP 
Effective TOT  1.671*** 2.103*** 
  [0.255] [0.413] 
Effective TOT * Stock of Reserves  -3.683*** -8.875** 
  [0.714] [4.385] 
Observations  1547 316 
R-squared  0.504 0.5702 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reserves are always 
in terms of domestic GDP 
 
 
Summary of results:  
From table C.7 we observe that countries characterized by low private financial liquidity seem to 
leave more room international reserves as shock absorber. 
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To control for possible TOT endogeneity in countries with a high percentage of output dedicated to 
specific export markets (oil, minerals etc) we purged our main regression of countries with high 
specific export to GDP ratios.




Table C.8: Reserves as shock absorbers purged of possible TOT endogeneity from export 
dependency 
 
Dependent Variable LREER  All Countries 
All Countries 
 minus those with  
high dependency  
on Specific Exports 
Effective TOT  1.802*** 2.666*** 
  [0.244] [0.324] 
Effective TOT * Stock of 
Reserves  -3.873*** -6.517*** 
  [0.746] [0.953] 
Observations  1863 1645 
R-squared  0.4549 0.4623 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reserves are always 
in terms of domestic GDP 
 
 
Summary of results:  
 
Controling for possible endogeneity in the TOT shocks through world market share and export 
dependency leaves our main result unaffected. Moreover, purging countries with high export 























                                                 
17 These countries are: Algeria, Kingdom of Bahrain, Chile, Rep of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kuwait, 





APPENDIX D: The Role of Domestic Financial Development 
 
In this section we explore the effects of financial depth using liquid assets in the economy (M2 over 
GDP
18).  












Effective TOT  0.603*** 0.957***  0.445  1.950***  2.554***  -2.615 
  [0.131] [0.302] [0.402]  [0.358]  [0.579]  [2.711] 
Effective TOT* Stock of Int. Reserves  -3.601*** 5.378  17.423  -19.38***  -0.66  -3.068 
  [0.955] [9.994]  [14.245]  [2.709]  [7.209] [16.457] 
Effective TOT * Stock of Int. Reserves * FD  2.592* -15.362  -56.529  22.594***  -23.218  68.65 
  [1.403] [19.366]  [46.858]  [3.421]  [20.933] [48.033] 
Observations  1253 511 343 202  252  224 
R-squared  0.5662 0.645 0.5506  0.9229 0.6717 0.4283 
The measure used as a proxy of Financial Development (FD) in this table is the monetary aggregate M2 over Nominal GDP. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   
 











Lagged Effective TOT  0.629*** 0.810***  0.56  1.582***  2.653***  -2.602 
  [0.156] [0.289] [0.381]  [0.344]  [0.574]  [2.578] 
Lagged Effective TOT* Stock of IRs  -2.944** 8.837  3.679  -15.991***  0.939  -1.851 
  [1.201] [9.647] [14.045]  [2.298]  [5.474]  [15.414] 
Lagged Effective TOT * Stock of IRs *FD  1.515 -20.108 -6.076  18.418***  -29.423  44.116 
  [1.717]  [18.238]  [37.875] [2.826]  [20.139] [57.284] 
Observations  1256 505  343  201  252  221 
R-squared  0.5499 0.6412 0.5413  0.9175  0.6747  0.4277 
The measure used as a proxy of Financial Development (FD) in this table is the monetary aggregate M2 over Nominal GDP. 




                                                 
18 This is a rough measure of Liquid Liabilities but not uncommon in the literature (see Hausmann, R., Gavin, M. 
Pages-Serra, C. and Ernesto Stein (1999) “Financial Turmoil and Choice of Exchange Rate Regime.” 
Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper 400. 
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APPENDIX E: REGRESSIONS INCLUDING CAPITAL FLOWS AND ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE* 
 





* Following the BOP accounting conventions, “- Δ INTER. RESERVES” in this Appendix reports the decrease in 















EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP               
FDI  0.231 0.163  1.030***  2.676**  0.87  1.146  -0.771 
  [0.322] [0.345]  [0.323]  [1.147]  [0.927]  [0.723]  [0.744] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES  0.906*** 0.939***  0.471**  0.281  1.566***  1.642***  0.683 
  [0.206] [0.221]  [0.220]  [1.178]  [0.536]  [0.525]  [0.549] 
OTHER INVESTMENT  0.404** 0.393**  0.599***  0.870*  1.827***  0.044  0.581 
  [0.171] [0.182]  [0.149]  [0.453]  [0.379]  [0.296]  [0.381] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT.  0.309 0.193  0.497***  -0.768  1.598***  0.492*  -2.405*** 
  [0.189] [0.255]  [0.186]  [0.636]  [0.507]  [0.287]  [0.748] 
SHOCKS              
TERMS OF TRADE  1.669*** 1.681***  1.356***  0.493  3.195***  1.905***  0.491 
  [0.203] [0.214]  [0.220]  [0.720]  [0.410]  [0.431]  [0.513] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
-0.105* -0.111*  -0.027  -0.061  -0.191* -0.157**  -0.114 
  [0.054] [0.058]  [0.032]  [0.119]  [0.102]  [0.063]  [0.215] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE              
TRADE OPENNESS  -0.900*** -0.860***  -1.215***  -1.198**  -1.021***  -1.273***  -1.223*** 
  [0.129] [0.144]  [0.119]  [0.463]  [0.296]  [0.310]  [0.184] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH  0.003 0.003  0.008  -0.012  -0.406***  0.007  0.013 
  [0.006] [0.007]  [0.020]  [0.010]  [0.135]  [0.007]  [0.253] 
RELATIVE INCOME  0.391 -0.013  1.114***  -1.792**  -0.028  0.442  -3.397*** 
  [0.362] [0.507]  [0.212]  [0.795]  [0.639]  [1.157]  [0.864] 
Observations  1584 1136  448  193  235  336  194 
R-squared  0.5356 0.5226  0.7643  0.5634  0.7906  0.5054  0.5064   Appendix                         24          













EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL  INFLOWS                
FDI    -0.889 -1.162  3.964***  -10.177*  4.225 -5.303**  -2.685 
    [0.856] [0.929]  [1.514]  [5.609]  [4.277]  [2.648]  [2.914] 
  TRADE OPENNES  1.272* 1.477*  -7.354**  28.911***  -8.599 20.479**  1.245 
    [0.762] [0.829]  [3.391]  [11.076]  [10.758] [8.211]  [2.312] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES    2.675*** 2.907***  -1.081  0.662  1.027  -0.073  4.483*** 
    [0.487] [0.547]  [1.344]  [2.468]  [1.939]  [2.187]  [1.482] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -3.255*** -3.556***  3.861  0.064  0.844  5.387 -4.432*** 
    [0.736] [0.803]  [3.306]  [4.772]  [4.450]  [6.437]  [1.368] 
OTHER INVESTMENT    1.094*** 1.127***  1.516***  5.465***  -0.696  1.623**  2.705*** 
    [0.328] [0.379]  [0.562]  [1.192]  [2.541]  [0.801]  [1.022] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -1.271** -1.328**  -2.695**  -9.445***  5.964  -4.752**  -2.345*** 
    [0.580] [0.638]  [1.338]  [2.110]  [6.401]  [2.346]  [0.892] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT    1.984 1.841 4.989***  12.274*  3.143 -2.096  18.368*** 
    [1.869] [2.607]  [1.192]  [6.751]  [2.800]  [3.106]  [4.893] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -0.015 -0.014 -0.046***  -0.118*  -0.017  0.028  -0.189*** 
    [0.019] [0.026]  [0.012]  [0.066]  [0.029]  [0.031]  [0.046] 
SHOCKS 
 
              
TERMS OF TRADE    2.201*** 2.258***  1.700***  1.149  3.687***  1.195 2.686*** 





-4.252*** -4.652***  -3.168  -20.086  -6.635  10.686  -7.968*** 
    [0.978] [1.042]  [3.856]  [12.609]  [4.584]  [8.469]  [2.437] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
  -0.103* -0.112*  -0.01  -0.01  -0.219**  -0.171***  -0.057 
    [0.055] [0.060]  [0.032]  [0.096]  [0.104]  [0.058]  [0.172] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE                
TRADE OPENNESS    -0.915*** -0.865***  -1.204***  -1.657***  -0.910***  -1.742***  -1.030*** 
    [0.127] [0.142]  [0.119]  [0.515]  [0.290]  [0.339]  [0.159] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH    0.002 0.003  -0.009  -0.001  -0.391***  0.008  0.004 
    [0.006] [0.007]  [0.023]  [0.012]  [0.148]  [0.007]  [0.229] 
RELATIVE INCOME    -0.068 -0.701  1.321***  -2.730***  0.092  -0.203  -3.358*** 
    [0.369] [0.524]  [0.231]  [0.946]  [0.862]  [1.225]  [0.820] 
Observations    1578 1130  448  193  235  336  194 
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EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP              
FDI  0.188 0.191 0.169 -1.278***  0.63  1.952***  -0.216 
  [0.195] [0.205] [0.323]  [0.423]  [0.967]  [0.536]  [0.342] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES  0.569*** 0.569*** 0.824***  0.288  0.448  1.402***  0.515** 
  [0.149] [0.160] [0.163]  [0.296]  [0.572]  [0.443]  [0.246] 
OTHER INVESTMENT  0.032 0.009  0.676*** 0.265*  1.059***  -0.305  0.290* 
  [0.144] [0.153] [0.108]  [0.147]  [0.349]  [0.256]  [0.168] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT  0.358** 0.412**  0.489***  -0.177  0.564 0.283  0.895*** 
  [0.154] [0.205] [0.127]  [0.231]  [0.434]  [0.258]  [0.312] 
SHOCKS             
TERMS OF TRADE  0.317** 0.299**  0.804***  -0.901***  0.832**  0.802***  0.446*** 
  [0.126] [0.132] [0.146]  [0.304]  [0.404]  [0.296]  [0.159] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
-0.149*** -0.147*** -0.137***  -0.254***  -0.245**  -0.128**  -0.132 
  [0.040] [0.043] [0.026]  [0.042]  [0.101]  [0.052]  [0.082] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE              
TRADE OPENNESS  -0.269*** -0.257*** -0.459***  -1.143***  -0.819***  -0.855***  -0.187** 
  [0.080] [0.090] [0.080]  [0.157]  [0.250]  [0.216]  [0.089] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH  0.009**  0.009**  0.035* -0.009*** -0.380***  0.009*  -0.215* 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.021]  [0.003]  [0.117]  [0.005]  [0.129] 
RELATIVE INCOME  0.881*** 1.119***  0.144  1.028***  -0.860*  2.140**  1.614*** 
  [0.157] [0.218] [0.138]  [0.182]  [0.464]  [0.963]  [0.289] 
Observations  1584 1136 448  193  235  336  194 
R-squared  0.1096 0.1059 0.3046  0.515  0.3767  0.2314  0.2547   Appendix                         26          













EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL  INFLOWS                
FDI    0.447 0.485 4.451***  -0.333  0.064 -2.591  -0.414 
    [0.646] [0.728]  [1.471]  [1.863]  [3.831]  [1.924]  [1.614] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -0.388 -0.4  -10.355*** -0.773  1.724  14.284**  0.083 
    [0.570] [0.642]  [3.417]  [3.554]  [9.870]  [6.117]  [1.284] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES    1.754*** 1.829***  2.380**  2.292**  1.081  -0.202  0.329 
    [0.344] [0.389]  [1.045]  [1.021]  [1.755]  [1.539]  [0.803] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -2.097*** -2.178***  -3.975  -4.281**  -1.292  5.255  0.274 
    [0.502] [0.553]  [2.568]  [1.882]  [4.407]  [4.620]  [0.755] 
OTHER INVESTMENT    0.344 0.201 1.689***  1.719***  1.781 1.379*  0.234 
    [0.238] [0.267]  [0.531]  [0.439]  [1.961]  [0.760]  [0.441] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -0.664 -0.462  -2.553**  -2.706***  -2.377 -4.967**  0.068 
    [0.450] [0.475]  [1.275]  [0.755]  [5.010]  [2.343]  [0.421] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT    -1.183 -2.337  0.57  -1.559  -3.524*  -1.69  7.620*** 
    [1.443] [1.914]  [0.806]  [3.131]  [2.056]  [2.369]  [2.564] 
  TRADE OPENNES  0.017 0.029  -0.001  0.015  0.042** 0.023  -0.065*** 
    [0.014] [0.019]  [0.009]  [0.030]  [0.021]  [0.022]  [0.024] 
SHOCKS   
            
TERMS OF TRADE    0.473*** 0.445**  0.725***  -0.24  2.191***  -0.166  0.709** 




RESERVES  -0.974 -0.9  1.068  -9.020*  -14.364***  13.784**  -0.849 
    [0.693] [0.731]  [2.296]  [5.383]  [4.637]  [6.012]  [1.028] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
 
-0.147*** -0.147***  -0.138***  -0.244***  -0.261***  -0.138*** -0.119 
    [0.041] [0.045]  [0.025]  [0.040]  [0.087]  [0.046]  [0.083] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE   
            
TRADE OPENNESS    -0.283*** -0.274***  -0.506***  -1.136***  -0.906***  -1.226***  -0.160* 
    [0.080] [0.090]  [0.085]  [0.176]  [0.235]  [0.252]  [0.092] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH    0.009** 0.009*  0.013  -0.008**  -0.379***  0.010**  -0.212* 
    [0.005] [0.005]  [0.025]  [0.003]  [0.126]  [0.005]  [0.126] 
RELATIVE INCOME    0.719*** 0.964***  0.219  0.900***  -1.824***  1.596 1.685*** 
    [0.172] [0.243]  [0.147]  [0.221]  [0.608]  [1.010]  [0.285] 
Observations    1578 1130  448  193  235  336  194 
R-squared    0.119 0.1161  0.3341  0.5548  0.4288 0.2866  0.2723 
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Table E.3.1: Time and Country Effects on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with no Interaction 






















EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP              
FDI  0.143 0.062  1.255***  4.312***  -0.671  -0.966  -0.357 
  [0.277] [0.257] [0.369]  [1.469]  [0.912]  [0.773]  [0.610] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES  0.524*** 0.491**  0.373*  0.31  1.341**  1.139*  -0.32 
  [0.179] [0.195] [0.223]  [1.185]  [0.574]  [0.581]  [0.425] 
OTHER INVESTMENT  0.092 -0.016  0.490*** 1.191**  1.418***  -0.172  -0.403 
  [0.165] [0.175] [0.163]  [0.528]  [0.389]  [0.286]  [0.343] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT  0.079 -0.106  0.532***  -0.767  0.777  0.239  -1.115* 
  [0.218] [0.298] [0.201]  [0.785]  [0.670]  [0.389]  [0.577] 
SHOCKS             
TERMS OF TRADE  1.143*** 0.766*** 1.564***  -1.797  2.330***  1.359***  0.105 
  [0.184] [0.191] [0.251]  [1.958]  [0.442]  [0.389]  [0.370] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
-0.201*** -0.214*** -0.129**  -0.39  -0.333***  -0.145**  -0.413** 
  [0.058] [0.063] [0.058]  [0.289]  [0.107]  [0.065]  [0.186] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE              
TRADE OPENNESS  -0.831*** -0.686*** -1.856***  -1.463**  -0.688*  -1.243***  0.513** 
  [0.146] [0.162] [0.177]  [0.617]  [0.382]  [0.312]  [0.220] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH  0.01 0.011  0.028  -0.012 -0.420***  0.008  -0.284 
  [0.007] [0.007] [0.019]  [0.014]  [0.145]  [0.007]  [0.196] 
RELATIVE INCOME  -0.163 -0.57  1.026***  -2.904**  -0.934  -2.697**  3.603*** 
  [0.349] [0.420] [0.220]  [1.164]  [0.658]  [1.091]  [0.922] 
Observations  1584 1136 448  193  235  336  194 
R-squared  0.602 0.6189  0.8008  0.6012  0.8303  0.6091  0.84   Appendix                         28          
Table E.3.2: Time and Country Effects on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with Interaction terms 














EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL  INFLOWS                
FDI    -0.842 -0.717  3.203**  -12.157*  6.777 -7.088***  3.147 
    [0.806] [0.861]  [1.493]  [6.807]  [4.846]  [2.536]  [2.419] 
  TRADE OPENNES  1.159 0.927  -5.038  33.862***  -18.249  19.115**  -3.343* 
    [0.727] [0.784]  [3.400]  [12.932]  [12.191] [7.803]  [1.932] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES    1.875*** 1.737***  -1.58  0.895  -1.388  -1.372  0.542 
    [0.428] [0.464]  [1.296]  [2.866]  [2.420]  [2.167]  [1.253] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -2.488*** -2.274***  4.714  -0.472  6.339  7.518  -0.821 
    [0.618] [0.663]  [3.228]  [5.474]  [5.435]  [6.104]  [1.264] 
OTHER INVESTMENT    0.483 0.262  1.223**  6.052***  -0.016 0.943  2.010** 
    [0.310] [0.356]  [0.611]  [1.317]  [2.651]  [0.717]  [0.825] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -0.731 -0.537  -2.356  -10.789***  3.182  -3.633*  -2.532*** 
    [0.530] [0.582]  [1.501]  [2.284]  [6.706]  [2.010]  [0.772] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT    -1.456 -2.676  6.916***  17.410**  -3.202 -4.940*  7.324* 
    [1.996] [2.726]  [1.450]  [8.617]  [3.529]  [2.858]  [4.145] 
  TRADE OPENNES  0.018 0.029 -0.066*** -0.170**  0.042 0.054*  -0.070* 
    [0.020] [0.027]  [0.015]  [0.085]  [0.037]  [0.029]  [0.039] 
SHOCKS                
TERMS OF TRADE    1.656*** 1.313***  2.071***  -0.027  2.510***  0.31 1.361*** 





-4.115*** -4.264***  -5.007  -17.702  -4.66  13.245*  -4.193*** 
    [0.879] [0.907]  [4.651]  [17.604]  [4.832]  [7.207]  [1.432] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
  -0.205*** -0.220***  -0.126**  -0.396  -0.382***  -0.167***  -0.307* 
    [0.059] [0.064]  [0.055]  [0.267]  [0.101]  [0.063]  [0.157] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE                
TRADE OPENNESS    -0.834*** -0.678***  -1.897***  -2.453***  -0.391  -1.630***  0.712*** 
    [0.147] [0.163]  [0.173]  [0.693]  [0.421]  [0.338]  [0.234] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH    0.009 0.011  0.025  -0.004  -0.405** 0.01  -0.404** 
    [0.007] [0.007]  [0.020]  [0.016]  [0.157]  [0.007]  [0.179] 
RELATIVE INCOME    -0.579* -1.083***  1.256***  -3.521***  -1.216  -3.357***  3.603*** 
    [0.351] [0.420]  [0.236]  [1.196]  [0.897]  [1.089]  [0.849] 
Observations    1578 1130  448  193  235  336  194 
R-squared    0.6129 0.6291  0.8157  0.6771  0.8376  0.6315  0.8684 
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Table E.4.1:  Country Effects and Quadratic Time trend on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with 






















EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP              
FDI  0.172 0.253  1.135*** 3.288**  0.117  0.838  -0.617 
  [0.280] [0.267] [0.334]  [1.327]  [0.971]  [0.772]  [0.537] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES  0.886*** 0.820***  0.436*  0.164  1.387**  1.241**  -0.204 
  [0.197] [0.220] [0.225]  [1.237]  [0.535]  [0.558]  [0.457] 
OTHER INVESTMENT  0.253 0.042  0.625*** 0.913*  1.585***  -0.019  -0.261 
  [0.167] [0.174] [0.152]  [0.475]  [0.375]  [0.297]  [0.327] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT  0.098 -0.01  0.471** -0.823  0.897  0.565*  -1.306** 
  [0.202] [0.262] [0.193]  [0.659]  [0.567]  [0.303]  [0.580] 
SHOCKS             
TERMS OF TRADE  1.295*** 0.918*** 1.358***  0.295  2.656***  1.488***  0.501 
  [0.197] [0.202] [0.247]  [0.771]  [0.419]  [0.427]  [0.370] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
-0.150*** -0.174***  -0.018  -0.061  -0.235**  -0.140**  -0.233 
  [0.056] [0.060] [0.033]  [0.119]  [0.098]  [0.068]  [0.165] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE              
TRADE OPENNESS  -0.654*** -0.734*** -1.338***  -1.349***  -0.598*  -1.368***  0.106 
  [0.135] [0.158] [0.142]  [0.513]  [0.338]  [0.328]  [0.219] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH  0.005 0.007 0.029  -0.012  -0.463***  0.006  -0.169 
  [0.006] [0.007] [0.020]  [0.010]  [0.143]  [0.007]  [0.207] 
RELATIVE INCOME  0.197 0.04  1.125***  -1.995**  -0.659  -0.159  2.754*** 
  [0.341] [0.424] [0.212]  [0.808]  [0.638]  [1.086]  [0.788] 
Observations  1584 1136 448  193  235  336  194 
R-squared  0.5614 0.587 0.7675  0.566  0.8056  0.5247  0.7562   Appendix                         30          
 
Table E.4.2:  Country Effects and Quadratic Time trend on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with 













EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL  INFLOWS                
FDI    -0.48 -0.054 4.061***  -8.831  5.683  -5.270**  4.569* 
    [0.827] [0.945]  [1.546]  [6.130]  [4.207]  [2.610]  [2.328] 
  TRADE OPENNES  0.794 0.389 -7.325**  27.869**  -13.911  19.185**  -5.048*** 
    [0.737] [0.841]  [3.485]  [11.956]  [10.641] [8.101]  [1.875] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES    2.352*** 2.042***  -1.046  1.162  0.006  -1.191  1.726 
    [0.449] [0.490]  [1.303]  [2.515]  [1.930]  [2.173]  [1.333] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -2.724*** -2.250***  3.628  -0.733  3.066  7.433  -2.083 
    [0.661] [0.710]  [3.224]  [4.789]  [4.332]  [6.293]  [1.299] 
OTHER INVESTMENT    0.736** 0.411  1.646***  5.777***  -0.702  1.459*  1.995** 
    [0.325] [0.361]  [0.579]  [1.247]  [2.391]  [0.800]  [0.791] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -0.907 -0.709  -2.985**  -9.828***  5.108 -4.609**  -2.569*** 
    [0.564] [0.592]  [1.407]  [2.219]  [6.161]  [2.318]  [0.779] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT    -0.337 -1.815  5.520***  13.283*  -1.862  -3.722  9.987* 
    [1.949] [2.635]  [1.296]  [6.825]  [2.812]  [3.069]  [5.595] 
  TRADE OPENNES  0.007 0.022 -0.052***  -0.127*  0.028  0.046  -0.101* 
    [0.019] [0.026]  [0.014]  [0.066]  [0.028]  [0.031]  [0.052] 
SHOCKS                
TERMS OF TRADE    1.879*** 1.488***  1.557***  0.904  3.226***  0.496 1.885*** 





-4.613*** -4.354***  -1.307  -18.49  -8.472*  13.001 -4.065** 
    [0.914] [0.943]  [4.265]  [13.991]  [4.562]  [7.932]  [1.820] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
  -0.150*** -0.177***  0.001  -0.015  -0.286***  -0.156** -0.125 
    [0.057] [0.062]  [0.033]  [0.097]  [0.097]  [0.063]  [0.133] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE                
TRADE OPENNESS    -0.650*** -0.700***  -1.373***  -1.788***  -0.364  -1.792*** 0.256 
    [0.135] [0.158]  [0.141]  [0.548]  [0.344]  [0.346]  [0.225] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH    0.005 0.007  0.016  -0.001  -0.450***  0.008  -0.308 
    [0.006] [0.007]  [0.023]  [0.012]  [0.155]  [0.007]  [0.187] 
RELATIVE INCOME    -0.269 -0.532  1.381***  -2.968***  -1.002  -0.867  2.565*** 
    [0.345] [0.438]  [0.230]  [0.955]  [0.865]  [1.112]  [0.739] 
Observations    1578 1130  448  193  235  336  194 
R-squared    0.5747 0.5978  0.7798  0.6379  0.8161  0.549  0.7937 
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EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP              
FDI  0.226 0.161  0.872*** 2.177*  0.087  1.095  -0.644 
  [0.313] [0.334] [0.308]  [1.135]  [1.005]  [0.690]  [0.677] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES  0.652*** 0.693***  0.31  0.389  0.33 1.359***  0.62 
  [0.195] [0.210] [0.232]  [1.090]  [0.601]  [0.481]  [0.504] 
OTHER INVESTMENT  0.252 0.242  0.500*** 0.789*  1.500***  -0.039  0.689* 
  [0.175] [0.187] [0.148]  [0.461]  [0.378]  [0.285]  [0.362] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT  0.204 0.1  0.365* -1.001  0.991*  0.396  -2.195*** 
  [0.188] [0.252] [0.193]  [0.674]  [0.509]  [0.284]  [0.722] 
SHOCKS             
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE  1.541*** 1.553*** 1.198***  -1.015  2.790***  1.814***  0.209 
  [0.237] [0.250] [0.225]  [1.051]  [0.464]  [0.437]  [0.513] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
-0.101* -0.104* -0.061*  -0.056  -0.199**  -0.170***  -0.074 
  [0.054] [0.059] [0.032]  [0.120]  [0.099]  [0.063]  [0.215] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE              
TRADE OPENNESS  -0.923*** -0.876*** -1.238***  -1.660***  -0.894***  -1.217***  -1.158*** 
  [0.128] [0.143] [0.123]  [0.561]  [0.306]  [0.315]  [0.179] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH  0.003 0.003 0.015  -0.020*  -0.380***  0.008  0.028 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.021]  [0.011]  [0.118]  [0.007]  [0.253] 
RELATIVE INCOME  0.183 -0.324  1.102*** -2.004**  -0.075  -0.353  -3.650*** 
  [0.367] [0.519] [0.214]  [0.822]  [0.664]  [1.071]  [0.852] 
Observations  1586 1137  449  192  234 336  194 
R-squared  0.5238 0.511 0.7605  0.5673  0.7618  0.5049  0.5043   Appendix                         32          













EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL  INFLOWS                
FDI    -0.796 -1.024  3.856**  -11.496**  5.834 -6.002**  -2.655 
    [0.843] [0.926]  [1.548]  [5.456]  [4.099]  [2.612]  [2.862] 
  TRADE OPENNES  1.128 1.292 -7.389** 30.778***  -13.209  22.273***  1.378 
    [0.759] [0.836]  [3.453]  [10.834]  [10.467] [8.102]  [2.285] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES    2.187*** 2.418***  -1.206  0.574  -1.439  -0.656 3.934** 
    [0.504] [0.569]  [1.357]  [2.495]  [2.409]  [2.139]  [1.530] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -2.758*** -3.039***  3.718  1.059  3.663  5.953  -3.696** 
    [0.767] [0.843]  [3.352]  [4.795]  [5.464]  [6.286]  [1.449] 
OTHER INVESTMENT    0.880*** 0.894**  1.266**  5.265***  -0.76  1.282*  2.573** 
    [0.323] [0.379]  [0.582]  [1.220]  [2.579]  [0.761]  [1.033] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -1.279** -1.312**  -2.281  -8.984***  4.966  -4.335**  -2.201** 
    [0.585] [0.645]  [1.391]  [2.173]  [6.516]  [2.174]  [0.877] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT    0.898 0.606 4.356***  13.446**  1.167 -5.217*  14.536*** 
    [1.964] [2.824]  [1.424]  [6.474]  [3.155]  [2.815]  [5.141] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -0.005 -0.003 -0.041***  -0.129**  -0.003 0.060**  -0.153*** 
    [0.020] [0.028]  [0.015]  [0.063]  [0.033]  [0.028]  [0.047] 
SHOCKS                
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE    2.060*** 2.124***  1.337***  -0.209  4.194***  1.403 1.944** 





-3.802*** -4.243***  -1.458  -17.459  -15.679***  5.931  -6.884** 
    [1.203] [1.271]  [3.739]  [12.196]  [5.171] [10.301]  [2.772] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
  -0.116** -0.122**  -0.052  -0.034  -0.301*** -0.192***  -0.058 
    [0.056] [0.061]  [0.032]  [0.108]  [0.096]  [0.056]  [0.183] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE                
TRADE OPENNESS    -0.908*** -0.850***  -1.238***  -1.944***  -0.818***  -1.688***  -0.984*** 
    [0.126] [0.142]  [0.125]  [0.574]  [0.302]  [0.358]  [0.158] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH    0.004 0.004  -0.003  -0.01  -0.406*** 0.01  -0.047 
    [0.006] [0.007]  [0.023]  [0.013]  [0.135]  [0.006]  [0.236] 
RELATIVE INCOME    -0.192 -0.897  1.303***  -2.780***  -0.323  -1.005  -3.705*** 
    [0.381] [0.550]  [0.235]  [0.929]  [0.896]  [1.226]  [0.855] 
Observations    1543 1097  446  192  230  324 190 
R-squared    0.5428 0.5327  0.77  0.6404  0.7859  0.5308  0.5641 
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Table E.6.1: Country Effects on De-trended Real Effective Exchange Rate with Lagged Terms of Trade 























EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP              
FDI  0.174 0.177 0.09  -1.090**  0.175  1.932***  -0.188 
  [0.187] [0.197] [0.304]  [0.458]  [0.915]  [0.527]  [0.345] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES  0.480*** 0.478*** 0.713***  0.279  -0.102  1.244***  0.378 
  [0.144] [0.154] [0.175]  [0.294]  [0.593]  [0.429]  [0.248] 
OTHER INVESTMENT  -0.023 -0.048  0.605*** 0.338**  0.977***  -0.353  0.292* 
  [0.143] [0.151] [0.105]  [0.155]  [0.328]  [0.255]  [0.169] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT  0.304* 0.346  0.419***  -0.063  0.357  0.171  0.984*** 
  [0.161] [0.217] [0.125]  [0.251]  [0.405]  [0.276]  [0.322] 
SHOCKS             
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE  0.378*** 0.365** 0.692***  -0.548*  0.868**  0.869***  0.300* 
  [0.139] [0.145] [0.133]  [0.297]  [0.338]  [0.281]  [0.170] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
-0.159*** -0.157*** -0.158***  -0.234***  -0.280**  -0.135***  -0.146* 
  [0.040] [0.043] [0.025]  [0.043]  [0.110]  [0.051]  [0.087] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE              
TRADE OPENNESS  -0.245*** -0.233*** -0.471***  -1.014***  -0.756***  -0.781***  -0.176** 
  [0.078] [0.087] [0.080]  [0.160]  [0.254]  [0.211]  [0.089] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH  0.010**  0.010**  0.040* -0.010*** -0.337***  0.010*  -0.228* 
  [0.004] [0.005] [0.022]  [0.003]  [0.105]  [0.005]  [0.134] 
RELATIVE INCOME  0.813*** 1.028***  0.152  1.123***  -0.865*  1.641*  1.544*** 
  [0.148] [0.209] [0.137]  [0.194]  [0.463]  [0.881]  [0.296] 
Observations  1586 1137 449  192  234  336  194 
R-squared  0.1148 0.1112 0.2966  0.5018  0.393  0.2226  0.2408   Appendix                         34          
Table E.6.2: Country Effects on De-trended Real Effective Exchange Rate with Lagged Terms of Trade 













EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL  INFLOWS                
FDI    0.453 0.488 4.327***  0.839  1.091 -3.242*  -0.574 
    [0.625] [0.705]  [1.458]  [1.826]  [3.479]  [1.930]  [1.637] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -0.434 -0.44  -10.216***  -2.892  -0.254  16.099***  0.336 
    [0.563] [0.635]  [3.348]  [3.590]  [9.077]  [6.064]  [1.292] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES    1.617*** 1.694***  2.312**  2.232**  0.624  -1.111  0.177 
    [0.357] [0.405]  [1.064]  [1.000]  [1.944]  [1.483]  [0.831] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -1.936*** -2.021***  -4.003  -3.882**  -2.016  7.354*  0.438 
    [0.522] [0.575]  [2.612]  [1.835]  [4.741]  [4.391]  [0.793] 
OTHER INVESTMENT    0.312 0.153 1.563***  1.771***  0.823 1.329*  0.117 
    [0.242] [0.273]  [0.533]  [0.471]  [1.894]  [0.741]  [0.448] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -0.707 -0.485  -2.335*  -2.589***  0.134 -5.020**  0.23 
    [0.463] [0.489]  [1.282]  [0.811]  [4.861]  [2.246]  [0.419] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT    -1.511 -2.926  0.011  0.276  -3.458  -2.637  7.262** 
    [1.572] [2.133]  [0.965]  [3.181]  [2.195]  [2.518]  [2.817] 
  TRADE OPENNES  0.02 0.035*  0.004  -0.002  0.041* 0.032  -0.061** 
    [0.015] [0.021]  [0.010]  [0.030]  [0.023]  [0.024]  [0.026] 
SHOCKS                
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE    0.490** 0.471**  0.497**  -0.281  2.711***  0.239 0.581 





-0.783 -0.763  2.631  -2.955  -19.071***  8.143  -1.018 
    [0.863] [0.895]  [2.290]  [6.366]  [4.421]  [6.695]  [1.106] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
  -0.157*** -0.158***  -0.162***  -0.241***  -0.343***  -0.144*** -0.125 
    [0.041] [0.045]  [0.025]  [0.043]  [0.070]  [0.045]  [0.088] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE                
TRADE OPENNESS    -0.257*** -0.246***  -0.521***  -0.978***  -0.773***  -1.169***  -0.156* 
    [0.080] [0.090]  [0.084]  [0.169]  [0.209]  [0.252]  [0.093] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH    0.010** 0.010**  0.018  -0.009**  -0.340*** 0.010**  -0.215* 
    [0.005] [0.005]  [0.026]  [0.004]  [0.110]  [0.005]  [0.128] 
RELATIVE INCOME    0.673*** 0.909***  0.21  1.117***  -1.870***  0.996 1.594*** 
    [0.163] [0.234]  [0.146]  [0.226]  [0.609]  [1.006]  [0.296] 
Observations    1543 1097  446  192  230  324 190 
R-squared    0.1238 0.1214  0.3275  0.5344  0.4826  0.2844  0.2601 
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Table E.7.1: Time and Country Effects on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with Lagged Terms of 























EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP              
FDI  0.11 0.05  1.057***  4.526*** -1.161  -0.93  -0.372 
  [0.272] [0.254] [0.341]  [1.473]  [0.894]  [0.728]  [0.556] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES  0.352** 0.383**  0.189  1.085  0.564  0.948*  -0.301 
  [0.170] [0.186] [0.245]  [1.019]  [0.571]  [0.522]  [0.399] 
OTHER INVESTMENT  -0.012 -0.093  0.390** 1.437***  1.132***  -0.17  -0.324 
  [0.168] [0.177] [0.167]  [0.501]  [0.379]  [0.268]  [0.319] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT  -0.033 -0.207 0.411*  -0.622  0.298  0.262  -0.874 
  [0.228] [0.318] [0.218]  [0.793]  [0.648]  [0.368]  [0.537] 
SHOCKS             
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE  1.089*** 0.764*** 1.490***  -5.558**  2.123***  1.472***  0.129 
  [0.214] [0.220] [0.270]  [2.164]  [0.456]  [0.379]  [0.313] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
-0.208*** -0.218*** -0.170***  -0.227  -0.323***  -0.152**  -0.384** 
  [0.058] [0.062] [0.057]  [0.240]  [0.101]  [0.062]  [0.180] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE              
TRADE OPENNESS  -0.798*** -0.652*** -1.862***  -1.987***  -0.685*  -1.200***  0.520** 
  [0.148] [0.167] [0.180]  [0.651]  [0.396]  [0.329]  [0.217] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH  0.01 0.011*  0.042** -0.027* -0.434***  0.009  -0.312 
  [0.006] [0.007] [0.021]  [0.014]  [0.130]  [0.007]  [0.196] 
RELATIVE INCOME  -0.329 -0.781*  1.032*** -3.698***  -1.324*  -3.288***  3.683*** 
  [0.353] [0.427] [0.223]  [1.079]  [0.693]  [0.966]  [0.850] 
Observations  1586 1137 449  192  234  336  194 
R-squared  0.595 0.6144  0.7969  0.6389  0.8214  0.6134  0.852   Appendix                         36          
Table E.7.2: Time and Country Effects on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with Lagged Terms of 













EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL  INFLOWS                
FDI    -0.831 -0.713  3.247**  -8.936  6.049 -8.091***  2.353 
    [0.801] [0.878]  [1.506]  [6.490]  [4.573]  [2.479]  [2.375] 
  TRADE OPENNES  1.093 0.88  -5.404  28.069**  -16.342  21.152***  -2.525 
    [0.732] [0.810]  [3.414]  [12.023]  [11.562] [7.691]  [1.910] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES    1.490*** 1.410***  -1.559  1  -3.14  -2.361 -0.364 
    [0.441] [0.475]  [1.325]  [2.944]  [2.513]  [2.005]  [1.167] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -2.056*** -1.852***  4.028  1.199  8.678  8.96  0.346 
    [0.650] [0.693]  [3.314]  [5.773]  [5.648]  [5.657]  [1.174] 
OTHER INVESTMENT    0.376 0.184  1.008  5.857***  -0.177  0.892  1.713** 
    [0.303] [0.355]  [0.642]  [1.329]  [2.565]  [0.659]  [0.789] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -0.827 -0.645  -2.025  -9.540***  2.493 -3.708**  -2.169*** 
    [0.537] [0.592]  [1.573]  [2.366]  [6.544]  [1.843]  [0.711] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT    -2.232 -3.371  6.337***  16.965**  -4.317 -7.137***  7.387* 
    [2.119] [3.022]  [1.685]  [7.417]  [3.690]  [2.485]  [3.785] 
  TRADE OPENNES  0.025 0.035 -0.062*** -0.165**  0.048 0.077***  -0.068* 
    [0.021] [0.031]  [0.017]  [0.073]  [0.039]  [0.025]  [0.035] 
SHOCKS                
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE    1.627*** 1.356***  1.851***  -3.303  3.258***  0.809 1.261*** 





-3.884*** -4.139***  -4.66  -16.033  -13.698***  8.834 -4.812*** 
    [1.108] [1.132]  [4.707]  [15.835]  [4.996]  [7.751]  [1.423] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
  -0.218*** -0.228***  -0.187***  -0.295  -0.431***  -0.188***  -0.310** 
    [0.059] [0.063]  [0.054]  [0.220]  [0.096]  [0.060]  [0.155] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE                
TRADE OPENNESS    -0.828*** -0.682***  -1.917***  -2.693***  -0.461  -1.574***  0.801*** 
    [0.148] [0.169]  [0.178]  [0.713]  [0.435]  [0.354]  [0.240] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH    0.011 0.011*  0.038*  -0.02  -0.483***  0.011*  -0.453** 
    [0.006] [0.007]  [0.022]  [0.017]  [0.153]  [0.006]  [0.175] 
RELATIVE INCOME    -0.663* -1.201***  1.252***  -4.006***  -1.828** -4.387***  3.732*** 
    [0.365] [0.439]  [0.238]  [1.093]  [0.895]  [1.047]  [0.801] 
Observations    1543 1097  446  192  230  324 190 
R-squared    0.6088 0.6267  0.811  0.6989  0.842  0.6508  0.8754 
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Table E.8.1:  Country Effects and Quadratic Time trend on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with 























EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL INFLOWS OVER GDP              
FDI  0.177 0.268  0.999*** 3.130**  -0.728  0.913  -0.567 
  [0.271] [0.262] [0.320]  [1.377]  [1.008]  [0.724]  [0.509] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES  0.692*** 0.700***  0.265  0.314  0.291 1.118**  -0.278 
  [0.185] [0.207] [0.235]  [1.131]  [0.589]  [0.501]  [0.420] 
OTHER INVESTMENT  0.135 -0.035  0.527***  0.883*  1.293***  -0.074  -0.165 
  [0.170] [0.177] [0.154]  [0.479]  [0.370]  [0.285]  [0.328] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT  -0.033 -0.138 0.338*  -1.003  0.32 0.47  -1.158** 
  [0.209] [0.278] [0.204]  [0.680]  [0.565]  [0.300]  [0.568] 
SHOCKS             
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE  1.196*** 0.863*** 1.247***  -1.093  2.265***  1.561***  0.312 
  [0.228] [0.230] [0.248]  [1.075]  [0.439]  [0.424]  [0.361] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
-0.155*** -0.185***  -0.05  -0.048  -0.246**  -0.160**  -0.263 
  [0.056] [0.060] [0.032]  [0.121]  [0.102]  [0.066]  [0.166] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE              
TRADE OPENNESS  -0.628*** -0.671*** -1.373***  -1.802***  -0.433  -1.313***  0.196 
  [0.135] [0.159] [0.146]  [0.588]  [0.348]  [0.341]  [0.219] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH  0.006  0.008  0.040* -0.02 -0.445***  0.008  -0.126 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.021]  [0.012]  [0.126]  [0.007]  [0.208] 
RELATIVE INCOME  0.02 -0.095  1.110***  -2.269***  -0.84  -0.616  2.851*** 
  [0.343] [0.423] [0.212]  [0.857]  [0.672]  [1.036]  [0.733] 
Observations  1586 1137 449  192  234  336  194 
R-squared  0.5512 0.5779 0.7648  0.5712  0.7856  0.5196  0.7662   Appendix                         38          
Table E.8.1:  Country Effects and Quadratic Time trend on Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate with 













EXPORTERS  LATAM   ASIA 
CAPITAL  INFLOWS                
FDI    -0.427 0.012  3.977**  -10.008  6.101 -5.805**  4.324* 
    [0.821] [0.950]  [1.569]  [6.179]  [3.820]  [2.580]  [2.330] 
  TRADE OPENNES  0.695 0.294 -7.362**  29.862**  -15.207  20.164**  -4.705** 
    [0.740] [0.854]  [3.530]  [11.942]  [9.742]  [8.048]  [1.882] 
− Δ INTER. RESERVES    1.922*** 1.580***  -1.168  1.624  -2.4  -1.938  0.605 
    [0.465] [0.507]  [1.311]  [2.553]  [2.421]  [2.121]  [1.290] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -2.228*** -1.644**  3.482  -0.573  6.178  8.313  -0.867 
    [0.696] [0.743]  [3.263]  [4.875]  [5.365]  [6.128]  [1.272] 
OTHER INVESTMENT    0.589* 0.3  1.412** 5.779***  -0.898 1.165  1.752** 
    [0.317] [0.356]  [0.599]  [1.271]  [2.341]  [0.753]  [0.784] 
  TRADE OPENNES  -0.950* -0.762  -2.605*  -9.691***  4.563  -4.177*  -2.252*** 
    [0.568] [0.597]  [1.460]  [2.298]  [6.005]  [2.168]  [0.735] 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT    -1.119 -2.494  4.911***  15.171**  -4.743 -6.504**  5.621 
    [2.061] [2.947]  [1.522]  [6.390]  [3.060]  [2.757]  [6.254] 
  TRADE OPENNES  0.014 0.027 -0.047*** -0.145**  0.052*  0.074***  -0.058 
    [0.021] [0.030]  [0.016]  [0.062]  [0.031]  [0.027]  [0.057] 
SHOCKS                
Lagged TERMS OF TRADE    1.787*** 1.465***  1.250***  -0.469  3.805***  0.791 1.185** 





-4.203*** -4.062***  0.223  -15.305  -17.861***  9.294  -2.97 
    [1.132] [1.135]  [4.185]  [13.009]  [4.985]  [9.537]  [2.126] 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATE APPRECIATION  
AGAINST US $ 
  -0.162*** -0.191***  -0.038  -0.031  -0.377***  -0.175***  -0.19 
    [0.057] [0.062]  [0.032]  [0.108]  [0.091]  [0.060]  [0.144] 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE                
TRADE OPENNESS    -0.641*** -0.691***  -1.418***  -2.091***  -0.204  -1.762*** 0.406* 
    [0.135] [0.161]  [0.148]  [0.598]  [0.344]  [0.361]  [0.224] 
EXCESS MONEY GROWTH    0.006 0.008  0.025  -0.01  -0.481***  0.009  -0.302 
    [0.006] [0.007]  [0.023]  [0.014]  [0.144]  [0.006]  [0.190] 
RELATIVE INCOME    -0.339 -0.545  1.362***  -3.094***  -1.602* -1.299  2.733*** 
    [0.356] [0.450]  [0.232]  [0.955]  [0.891]  [1.151]  [0.697] 
Observations    1543 1097  446  192  230  324 190 
R-squared    0.5656 0.5916  0.7759  0.6442  0.8155  0.5539  0.792 
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Appendix F: REER volatility vs. International Reserves 
 
  
 Table F.1: The Relationship between REER volatility and International Reserves 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 REER Volatility  Reserves  SE  Constant SE  Observations R-squared
All  -9.612*** [3.155]  4.935***  [0.395]  1292  0.215 
Industrial Countries        0.384    [2.291]  2.139***  [0.163]  429  0.147 
Developing Countries  -10.419*** [3.429]  6.106***  [0.528]  863  0.178 
East/South Asia  -7.557*** [1.830]  5.338***  [0.399]  286  0.278 
Latin America  -29.861*** [6.570]  7.197***  [0.725]  280  0.121 
Natural Resource Countries       -9.172  [9.394]  5.810***  [1.127]  360  0.204 
Manufactures Countries  -9.862*** [3.317]  3.142***  [0.293]  139  0.232 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Definitions:  
REER Volatility: Standard Deviation of the Real Effective Exchange Rates over the 12 months 
of each year 
Reserves: Average yearly stock of International Reserves 
 
List of Countries Included: 
 
Industrial      Developing    S/E Asia  Latin America Natural Resource  Manufactures
Australia Argentina  Israel  China  Argentina  Australia  Finland 
Canada Brazil  Korea  Honk  Kong  Brazil  Canada  Japan 
Denmark Bulgaria  Kuwait  India  Chile  Chile  Korea 
Finland Chile  Malaysia  Indonesia  Colombia  Kuwait  Sweden 
Hungary China Mexico  Japan  Ecuador  Mexico   
Japan China  Morocco  Korea  Mexico  Nigeria   
New Zealand  Colombia  Nigeria  Malaysia  Peru  Norway   
Norway Czech  Republic  Pakistan Philippines  Venezuela  Russia   
Spain Ecuador  Peru  Singapore    Saudi  Arabia   
Sweden Egypt Philippines  Thailand    South  Africa  
Switzerland Euro  Area  Poland      Venezuela   
United Kingdom  India  Romania         
United States  Indonesia  Russia          
    Saudi Arabia          
   Singapore           
   Slovenia           
    South Africa          
   Thailand           
   Turkey           
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Appendix G: The effect of changes in the levels of Terms of Trade, Stock of International 
Reserves and Domestic Liquidity on the Real Effective Exchange Rates 
 
 
Table G1: The Effect of  Log ETOT and Stock of Reserves on the Log of REER 
 
All  Developing 
Countries 
Industrial 




Log Effective Terms of Trade  1.384*** 1.358***  1.137***  -0.415  1.644*** 3.220***  0.581 
  [0.181] [0.195]  [0.355]  [0.406]  [0.482] [0.434]  [1.006] 
Stock of International  
Reserves over GDP  -1.084*** -1.254***  0.520**  -2.727***  0.179  -2.315***  -1.990*** 
  [0.126] [0.137]  [0.217]  [0.301]  [0.602] [0.470]  [0.641] 
Observations  1863 1217  646 202  343  253  271 
R-squared  0.4689 0.4461  0.6021  0.3212  0.3905 0.6603  0.4307 
Robust standard errors in brackets, 





Table G2: The Effect of Log ETOT, Stock of Reserves and Domestic Liquidity on the Log of REER 
 
 
All  Developing 
Countries 
Industrial 




Log Effective Terms of Trade  1.450*** 1.410***  1.180***  -0.398  1.614*** 3.150***  -0.593 
  [0.191] [0.204]  [0.412]  [0.337]  [0.468] [0.424]  [2.236] 
Stock of International  
Reserves over GDP 
-1.070*** -1.143***  0.785**  0.535  0.363  -2.280***  -4.343** 
  [0.142] [0.153]  [0.306]  [0.593]  [0.736] [0.454]  [1.764] 
Level of M2 over GDP  -0.12 -0.278*  0.125  -2.146***  -0.23 0.628**  0.858 
  [0.113] [0.149]  [0.118]  [0.376]  [0.340] [0.293]  [0.895] 
Observations  1511 1156  355 202  343  252  94 
R-squared  0.4685 0.4488  0.6193  0.4109  0.3917 0.6682  0.4505 
Robust standard errors in brackets, 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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